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 After Hobby Lobby: The “Religious           
For-Profit” and the Limits of the Autonomy 
Doctrine 
Angela C. Carmella* 
ABSTRACT 
Churches are protected under the autonomy doctrine, which is rooted in 
the Religion Clauses, to ensure that they are free to define their institutional 
identity and mission.  In more limited circumstances, many religious nonprof-
its also enjoy autonomy protections.  Now that the Supreme Court has decid-
ed in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. that for-profit corporations are 
capable of religious exercise and entitled to statutory free exercise protec-
tion, this Article poses a question that is on the horizon: would it ever be 
plausible to extend the autonomy doctrine to a for-profit institution?  This 
Article identifies several types of for-profits (named “religious for-profits”) 
that appear to deserve autonomy protection.  But it concludes that they do not 
– not as a matter of constitutional law.  This Article distinguishes religious 
for-profits from churches and from those religious nonprofits that warrant 
autonomy protection.  It also notes that autonomy protection for some reli-
gious nonprofits that act like for-profits is highly contested; now is certainly 
not the time to expand the doctrine to include for-profits. 
Why is it wrong to apply the autonomy doctrine to for-profit entities?  
Autonomy justifies categorical exemptions, which often result in harmful con-
sequences to specific individuals and groups.  If autonomy is extended to for-
profits, those negative impacts will multiply in number and intensity when 
coupled with the massive economic power of those entities.  Autonomy pro-
tections traditionally have been applied exclusively within the church-and-
nonprofit sector.  Indeed, autonomy is reserved for jurisgenerative communi-
ties operating under some type of consent based norms, which is not the case 
in the for-profit context.  Finally, the expansion of autonomy to include for-
profits threatens to dilute the entire doctrine, which could result in the loss of 
protections for churches on core matters of identity and mission.  Instead, 
this Article proposes that the best way for courts, legislators and regulators 
to protect the religious freedom of for-profit entities is to apply a balancing 
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Alyssa Musmanno, and Michael DeJianne for their excellent research assistance and 
to the Seton Hall Law School administration for summer research funds.  Special 
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approach, which takes into account and tries to mitigate the impacts on oth-
ers of any exemption granted to a religious claimant. 
INTRODUCTION 
When courts decide whether to protect religious exercise by giving a 
claimant an exemption from a law, they employ one of two approaches: either 
a balancing of the religious claim against the government’s interest or an 
autonomy approach.1  The balancing approach is commonly used when the 
issue is whether to grant a free exercise exemption available under several 
federal statutes, under the law in about half the states, and (in limited circum-
stances) under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.2  Balancing 
applies in most situations when a religious claimant – whether an individual 
or an entity – demonstrates a government infringement on religious exercise.3  
The autonomy approach, rooted in both the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses, applies only to churches and to religious nonprofits (in certain cir-
cumstances) and serves to ensure their institutional freedom to define their 
identity and pursue their mission.4  Under the balancing approach, courts are 
supposed to consider any negative impacts an exemption might have on iden-
tifiable persons or groups when assessing whether the exemption is warrant-
ed.5  But under the autonomy approach, which employs categorical exemp-
tions, courts do not take into account the resulting consequences.6  Even in 
the face of severe impacts that are not legally redressable, the exemption will 
be granted in order to ensure the autonomy of the religious institution. 
The Supreme Court recently determined in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc. that for-profit corporations can exercise religion.7  Now that this 
threshold decision on for-profit religious exercise has been made, the norma-
tive question emerges: how ought we protect for-profits?  Should they be 
protected under the common understanding of religious liberty, with their 
claims balanced against governmental interests, and with a full evaluation of 
the impacts of an exemption?  Or should they be protected under an autono-
my analysis, with no regard for the consequences of an exemption?  As a 
result of the Hobby Lobby decision, companies with a religious objection to 
contraceptive coverage as part of their employees’ health insurance plans are 
exempt from the requirement to provide it.  The Hobby Lobby majority em-
ployed a balancing approach under the statutory framework of the litigation, 
 
 1. For a discussion of the contrast, see Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 683 
(7th Cir. 2013) (holding that the contraception mandate substantially burdened plain-
tiffs). 
 2. See discussion infra note 49. 
 3. See infra Part I. 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See infra Part I. 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014). 
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but owing to some unique circumstances in the case, the dissent (which 
would not have protected the for-profits at all) read the decision as the irre-
sponsible grant of autonomy to a new class of claimants.8   The dissent’s in-
terpretation of the Court’s opinion raises several important questions.  Must 
autonomy be limited to the church and religious nonprofit context?  Could a 
for-profit entity explicitly make, and prevail on, an autonomy claim?  More 
pointedly, are there particular types of for-profit entities that might explicitly 
and plausibly claim that the autonomy doctrine is applicable to them? 
The most likely candidate for autonomy protection will be referred to as 
the “religious for-profit.”  A religious for-profit is an entity with explicit reli-
gious identity, mission, and undeniable “religious character”9 that provides 
either: 1) religious goods and services; or 2) education, health care or social 
services more characteristic of a traditional nonprofit.  Such an entity differs 
substantially from nearly every business that challenged the contraception 
mandate: closely-held for-profits engaged in secular endeavors, like arts and 
crafts retailers and cabinet manufacturers, but operated according to the own-
ers’ religious principles.10  It may be that after Hobby Lobby, courts will re-
main within the balancing framework for assessing the free exercise claims of 
such secular businesses and their owners.  But how will courts engage reli-
gious for-profits?  These entities, in contrast to the secular corporations 
owned and operated by religious families, are not dependent upon or defined 
by their owners’ faith.  They are free-standing religious entities with a reli-
gious mission and may be closely connected, formally or informally, to a 
church or religious population.  When religious for-profits bring free exercise 
claims post-Hobby Lobby, courts may be tempted to extend autonomy protec-
tions to them, perhaps by analogy to religious nonprofits. 
An extension of the autonomy doctrine to for-profits as a constitutional 
mandate would be a mistake.  The doctrine should remain limited to churches 
and religious nonprofits, where it functions to protect their institutional integ-
rity and normative role in civil society, and where norms of consent operate 
 
 8. Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Several scholars noted concerns with 
extending autonomy to the secular corporate plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby.  See, e.g., 
Zoë Robinson, The Contraception Mandate and the Forgotten Constitutional Ques-
tion, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 749, 776-78, 785-93 (2014) (providing guidelines for defin-
ing “religious” institutions that enjoy autonomy protection and excluding “faith-
based” businesses); Robert K. Vischer, Do For-Profit Businesses Have Free Exercise 
Rights?, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 369, 389 (2013) (explicating prudential con-
cerns of a constitutionally protected right of autonomy for corporations, noting “the 
pitfalls of extending the same free exercise rights to for-profit businesses as to 
churches”). 
 9. See generally Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 345 n.6 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 10. See cases cited infra note 51.  Mardel, also owned by the same family that 
owned Hobby Lobby, is a chain of religious bookstores that accounts for a smaller 
part of the family’s business.  See discussion infra Part IV.B (discussing Mardel and 
similar establishments that provide religious goods and services). 
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(with some qualifications).11  When courts employ autonomy, they are un-
concerned with the negative impacts on identifiable persons and groups that 
result.  Clergy men and women are not entitled to sue their churches for em-
ployment discrimination;12 members cannot sue their churches for wrongful 
excommunication;13 dissenting factions have no right to church governance 
or property;14 patients denied abortions or sterilizations cannot compel reli-
giously-affiliated hospitals to provide them;15 employees not conforming to 
faith requirements cannot sue for religious discrimination;16 those harmed by 
church counseling cannot claim clergy malpractice;17 students and their fami-
lies have no right to challenge decisions to close a religiously-affiliated 
school;18 same-sex couples cannot sue churches for discrimination when de-
nied a church wedding.19  In most of these situations, there are compelling 
reasons for this “special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations,”20 
even where the individual or group has suffered a harm that would be legally 
redressable in another context under federal or state statute or under state tort 
or contract law.21 
Those reasons are rooted in the First Amendment, in which the Free Ex-
ercise Clause guarantees freedom to religious groups to define and constitute 
themselves, while the Establishment Clause ensures the structural independ-
ence of church and state.22  Together the Religion Clauses provide a frame-
work in which churches and religious nonprofits enjoy considerable latitude 
to serve as non-state mediating institutions in civil society.  Religious organi-
zations have the right to maintain a religious identity.23  The autonomy doc-
 
 11. Consent might seem to explain the appropriateness of autonomy in these 
cases, but the justifications are more complex.  See infra Part II.D. 
 12. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 13. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 14. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 15. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 16. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 17. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 18. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 19. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 20. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 
694, 706 (2012). 
 21. Of course, this “special solicitude” is not without limits, and the doctrine has 
been narrowed to make churches and religious nonprofits legally accountable for 
certain actions.  See generally Angela C. Carmella, The Protection of Children and 
Young People: Catholic and Constitutional Visions of Responsible Freedom, 44 B.C. 
L. REV. 1031 (2003); Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the 
Decline of Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219 (2000). 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing in relevant part that “Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise there-
of”). 
 23. See Thomas C. Berg, Progressive Arguments for Religious Organizational 
Freedom: Reflections on the HHS Mandate, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 279, 316 
(2013). 
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trine protects not only the community but, ultimately, the individual who 
desires to belong to and participate in a faith community.  In order to facili-
tate voluntary decision-making in this arena, it is critical to preserve the free-
dom of churches and other religious organizations to define and perpetuate 
themselves as they see fit. 
By virtue of constitutional design, then, autonomy is intended to protect 
the institutional freedom of churches and many religious nonprofits in a cate-
gorical way, without regard to the loss of basic legal rights this protection can 
entail for others.  Precisely because this approach is often accompanied by 
harmful impacts on identifiable persons and groups, it should be contained.24  
Indeed, the appropriate contours of autonomy, as applied to religious non-
profits in certain circumstances, are currently under intense scrutiny and are 
highly contested.25  If we struggle over the doctrine’s contours in the nonprof-
it context, then surely it should not be extended to for-profit institutions – not 
even to undeniably religious for-profits.  Courts should adjudicate the free 
exercise claims of all for-profits, whether they are secular corporations oper-
ated according to religious beliefs or religious for-profits, within a balancing 
framework.26  Although religious for-profits might look like analogs to reli-
gious institutions that warrant autonomy protection, courts should resist clas-
sifying them as such for several reasons. 
First, autonomy is based upon the most fundamental aspect of church-
state relations: there are two separate jurisdictions.27  Churches and many 
religious nonprofits enjoy a limited sovereignty with respect to theological 
and ecclesiastical matters, which are outside the state’s competence.28  It is 
well settled that these matters, and decision-making that relates to them, must 
remain exclusively in the sphere of religious communities.29  Churches and 
nonprofits undertaking charitable works – education, service, health care – 
have populated this sphere; commercial actors are absent.  Even commercial 
nonprofits like religiously-affiliated hospitals, which are mission driven and 
 
 24.  Legislative exemptions can always be granted to for-profits as a matter of 
political evaluation of impacts.  Daniel O. Conkle, Free Exercise, Federalism, and the 
States As Laboratories, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 493, 496 (1999). 
 25. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 23, at 303-07; see also infra Part II.D. 
 26. See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 27. The jurisdictional concept is an ancient one: “Two There Are,” wrote Pope 
Gelasius in the fifth century.  See Paul Halsall, Gelasius I on Spiritual and Temporal 
Power, 494, FORDHAM UNIV., http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/source/gelasius1.asp 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2015).  For a discussion of church autonomy and its jurisdictional 
nature, see Vischer, supra note 8; see also Andrew Koppelman, “Freedom of the 
Church” and the Authority of the State, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 145, 145-46, 
162-64 (2013) (criticizing scholars who use a particularly robust autonomy concept 
referred to as “freedom of the church”). 
 28. See Koppelman, supra note 27, at 156-57. 
 29. See id. at 149. 
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participate in competitive secular markets, have enjoyed autonomy on only 
narrowly targeted religious matters.30 
The second reason to deny autonomy protection to for-profits is that au-
tonomy is reserved for those institutions that have “jurisgenerative” func-
tions.31  To be jurisgenerative, groups must “have as their goal uniquely reli-
gious objectives, . . . serve norm creating and reinforcing purposes and . . . 
provide social structures within which societal subgroups can function with-
out state oversight.”32  They must be “organized around a religious mission 
with a guiding doctrine and goal to facilitate individual and collective reli-
gious belief.”33  Churches and many religious nonprofits behave in this way.  
But do for-profits “generate[] norms for a definable collective group in order 
to facilitate individual belief”?34  Even if some for-profits, like providers of 
religious goods and services, can play a role in the life of a religious commu-
nity, for-profits – as a class – are not viewed as central “to the lived faith ex-
periences of most Americans.”35  Further, the jurisgenerative nature of an 
institution may be compromised when “ownership” is involved.  Nonprofits 
can earn a profit, but they have to reinvest it in the corporation or spend it to 
advance the corporation’s purpose.36  The nondistribution constraint thus 
requires continued reaffirmation of the religious mission.  This intensity is 
harder to maintain in for-profits, which distribute profit to own-
ers/shareholders and thus cater to interests that can distract attention from the 
for-profit’s mission.37 
Third, in addition to lacking the necessary jurisdictional and jurisgenera-
tive prerequisites for the application of church autonomy, for-profits are pri-
marily economic actors that wield “enormous market power . . . in the provi-
sion of essential goods and services, including the paths by which to earn a 
livelihood.”38  Given this “massive influence over individuals’ access to the 
building blocks of everyday life,” for-profits are “central to our ability to 
participate in modern life.”39  Churches and religious nonprofits, as a sector, 
 
 30. See infra Part II.C. 
 31. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term – Foreword: Nomos 
and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 26-33 (1983).  All private lawmaking generates 
norms.  Id. at 31.  The term is used here only with respect to the generation of reli-
gious norms. 
 32. Zoë Robinson, What Is a “Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. REV. 181, 225 
(2014). 
 33. Robinson, supra note 8, at 793. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Vischer, supra note 8, at 397. 
 36. See Andras Kosaras, Note, Federal Income and State Property Tax Exemp-
tion of Commercialized Nonprofits: Should Profit-Seeking Art Museums Be Tax Ex-
empt?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 115, 150 (2000). 
 37. See infra Part IV. 
 38. Vischer, supra note 8, at 398. 
 39. Id. at 391, 397. 
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command no comparable control.40  (Quite tellingly, in situations where reli-
gious nonprofits do exercise economic power on par with for-profits, courts 
have begun to question their entitlement to autonomy protection.)41 
An additional reason for not applying autonomy to for-profits is that the 
negative side effects of autonomy should remain circumscribed to the church 
and religious nonprofit context, where norms of consent operate.  If powerful 
for-profits are allowed the categorical exemptions of the autonomy approach, 
then countless identifiable persons and groups will suffer harm without legal 
redress – particularly harm with respect to their ability to access the economic 
“building blocks of everyday life.”42 
A final reason for not extending autonomy to for-profits is the concern 
that if the doctrine is applied broadly, courts will decline to apply it even to 
core religious institutions like churches.  We have seen the broad articulation 
of rights backfire in other areas of Religion Clause jurisprudence, where, for 
instance, a broad definition of religion, together with an aggressive approach 
to exemptions, was met with judicial resistance and resulted in watered down 
protections.43  If the autonomy doctrine does not make distinctions between 
businesses and churches, courts may begin to narrow the doctrine across the 
board, leaving churches without sufficient protection for identity and mission. 
The balancing approach should continue to apply to for-profits, both 
secular for-profits operated by owners with religious convictions (as in Hob-
by Lobby) and religious for-profits.  Balancing is broadly inclusive of multi-
ple types of free exercise claims – giving consideration to burdens on reli-
gious conscience, expression, practice, and formation of all types.  Balancing 
better protects for-profit claims44 because it gives courts the flexibility to take 
into account the degree of burden on religious exercise and the significance 
and implementation of the law, as well as the magnitude of the impacts that 
an exemption would produce.  Particularly with market actors that have pow-
er over goods, services, and jobs, a full airing and balancing of rights and 
interests is appropriate, especially where consent to religious norms is absent.  
 
 40. Id. at 391 (“The primary concern, I believe, is that for-profit corporations are 
so central to our ability to participate in modern life, including our ability to earn a 
livelihood.  They are inescapable conduits for many goods deemed fundamental to 
our modern existence.  We are uncomfortable exempting corporations from the law’s 
authority because it can be difficult for individuals to exempt themselves from the 
corporation’s authority.  Churches, when viewed from the perch of state agnosticism, 
are optional pursuits.  They do not govern access to wide swaths of employment or 
essential goods and services, and to the extent that church-affiliated organizations do 
govern such access, we become less comfortable treating those organizations as 
churches.”). 
 41. See infra Part II.D; see also infra note 227 (regarding similarities between 
nonprofit and for-profit hospitals). 
 42. See Vischer, supra note 8, at 397. 
 43. See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 44. This argument is in line with the limitations to autonomy protections sug-
gested by Professor Zoë Robinson.  Robinson, supra note 32, at 230-33. 
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There will be instances in which judicial balancing is not available to address 
burdens to religious exercise.45  But legislatures and regulators are also capa-
ble of (and probably better at) tailoring exemptions to protect religious free-
dom without thwarting the government’s interest and causing widespread 
impacts on third parties. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I explores the Hobby Lobby deci-
sion and its conflicting interpretations, and argues that – moving forward – 
for-profit free exercise protection should be confined to the decision’s balanc-
ing framework.  Part II describes the applicability of the autonomy doctrine to 
churches and religious nonprofits, noting its sometimes severe consequences 
on identifiable individuals or groups left without legal recourse.  Part III dis-
cusses the historic applicability of the balancing approach to for-profit reli-
gion claims and the attendant refusal to recognize jurisdictional or jurisgener-
ative elements in that context.  Part IV then evaluates the argument that au-
tonomy principles should be extended to free exercise claims of a “religious 
for-profit,” describing the dangers of such an extension, especially now that 
changes in corporate law facilitate the creation of for-profits with religious 
missions.  Part IV further explores the compelling reasons to limit the auton-
omy approach to the church-nonprofit context and contends that, as in Hobby 
Lobby, the protections offered by the balancing approach are sufficient and 
encourage the development of responsible freedom within the market context: 
impacts of exemptions will be given adequate consideration and attempts to 
avoid or mitigate those impacts will be required. 
I.  CONFINING HOBBY LOBBY TO ITS BALANCING FRAMEWORK 
The novel question of “for-profit” religious exercise came squarely be-
fore the U.S. Supreme Court in the 2014 term in a challenge to regulations 
issued by the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) under the 
Affordable Care Act (the “ACA”).46  In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, several 
closely held corporations and their owners objected on religious grounds to 
providing mandatory insurance coverage to their employees for two drugs 
and two devices.47  HHS defined the drugs and devices as contraceptives, 
while the corporations characterized the exact products as abortifacients.48  
Facing nearly half a billion dollars in fines, the corporations sought an ex-
emption from the requirement under the federal Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act (“RFRA”), which requires the government to demonstrate that a law 
substantially burdening a claimant’s religious exercise uses the least restric-
 
 45. See infra note 49. 
 46. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762-63 (2014); see 
also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012); 45 C.F.R. §§ 147.100-159.120 (2014). 
 47. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. 
 48. See id. 
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tive means to advance a compelling interest.49  The government argued that 
for-profit corporations were not “persons” capable of “religious exercise” 
under RFRA and that, even if they were, RFRA would not permit the denial 
of coverage to thousands of employees, to which they are otherwise entitled 
 
 49. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b) (2012).  RFRA prohibits govern-
ment from “substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if the bur-
den results from a rule of general applicability” unless the government “demonstrates 
that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling gov-
ernmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.”  § 2000bb-1(a)-(b).  RFRA applies to “any exercise of reli-
gion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”  42 
U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012). 
  The balancing test set forth in RFRA has a long history.  First set forth in 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963), it was abandoned in 1990 in Employ-
ment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
882-89 (1990), which held that facially neutral, generally applicable laws could not 
burden religion.  Smith did provide for several circumstances in which strict scrutiny 
continued to apply, so even as a matter of federal constitutional law there may be 
times when it is invoked.  See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993). 
  Three years later, RFRA was passed and currently applies to federal law; it 
was held unconstitutional as applied to the states in 1997.  City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507, 532-36 (1997).  In 2000, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), which also contains a balancing approach.  
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2012).  It applies to state and local land use regula-
tions and to state prison administration.  See id.; see also Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/rluipa.php (last visited Mar. 6, 2015); Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act Summary, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/rluipaexplain.php (last visited Apr. 6, 
2015). 
  About half the states employ a balancing approach, either by statute (state 
RFRAs) or by state constitutional interpretation.  Eugene Volokh, 1A. What Is the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 2, 2013, 7:34 AM), 
www.vo-lokh.com/2013/12/02/1a-religious-freedom-restoration-act/.  This, of course, 
means that not every claimed burden on religious exercise will be legally redressable 
under a balancing test: if no federal or state statute applies, and a court does not inter-
pret the federal or state constitution to require strict scrutiny, then Smith applies and 
an exemption will be denied.  Of course, the claimants can appeal to the political 
process to argue for legislative or regulatory exemption.  Dean Robert Vischer thinks 
this is actually a better route.  Vischer, supra note 8, at 399 (“There are many good 
reasons to defend the autonomy of for-profit businesses seeking to maintain or culti-
vate a distinct religious identity.  In most cases, though, legislatures are better suited 
to make judgments of calibration than courts are.  Their focus should be on maintain-
ing access to goods and services deemed essential by the political community, not on 
rejecting or affirming religious liberty rights as some sort of corporate trump card.  
Courts should recognize for-profit businesses as legitimate bearers of free exercise 
rights, but not without some trepidation.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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under federal law.50  These arguments were made in numerous for-profit chal-
lenges to the contraception mandate.51 
 
 50. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. 
 51. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (arts and crafts retailer); 
Autocam Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2901 (2014) (mem.) (vacating judgment and 
remanding to Sixth Circuit) (medical equipment manufacturer); Eden Foods, Inc. v. 
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014) (mem.) (vacating judgment and remanding to Sixth 
Circuit) (organic food producer); Gilardi v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 134 S. 
Ct. 2902 (2014) (mem.) (vacating and remanding D.C. Circuit decision) (produce 
distributor and green product distributor). 
  As of August 2014, the following results had been reached in each case when 
these arguments were advanced: 
  Granting Preliminary Relief: Newland v. Sebelius, 542 Fed. Appx. 706 (10th 
Cir. 2013) (granting preliminary injunction) (manufacturers and wholesale distribu-
tors of high-quality HVAC sheet metal products and equipment); Annex Med., Inc. v. 
Sebelius, No. 13-1118, 2013 WL 1276025 (8th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013) (granting prelimi-
nary injunction pending appeal) (medical device manufacturer); Catholic Benefits 
Ass’n LCA v. Sebelius, CIV-14-240-R, 2014 WL 2522357 (W.D. Okla. June 4, 2014) 
(granting Groups II and III preliminary injunction) (for-profit insurance company); 
Randy Reed Auto., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-6117-CV-SJ-ODS, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 169966 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 3, 2013) (granting preliminary injunction) (automo-
tive dealership); Armstrong v. Sebelius, No. 13-CV-00563-RBJ, 2013 WL 5213640 
(D. Colo. Sept. 17, 2013) (granting preliminary injunction) (residential mortgage 
banking center); Briscoe v. Sebelius, No. 13-CV-00285-WYD-BNB, 2013 WL 
4781711 (D. Colo. Sept. 6, 2013) (granting preliminary injunction) (operating assisted 
living centers, senior independent residences, and nursing facilities); Beckwith Elec. 
Co., Inc. v. Sebelius, 960 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (granting preliminary 
injunction) (electrical product manufacturer); Legatus v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 
794 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (granting preliminary injunction) (Catholic ambassadors); 
Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 2:12 CV 92 
DDN, 2013 WL 6858588 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 30, 2013) (granting preliminary injunction) 
(agricultural organization); Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, No. 12–0207, 2013 WL 
6835094 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2013) (granting preliminary injunction) (a college and a 
lumber business); Am. Pulverizer Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 
12-3459-CV-S-RED, 2012 WL 6951316 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2012) (granting prelim-
inary injunction) (wholesale scrap metal recycling and manufacturing of machines for 
said businesses); Order Granting Injunction Pending Appeal, O’Brien Indus. Hold-
ings, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 4:12-cv-00476-CEJ (8th Cir. 
Nov. 28, 2012) (manufacturing, supplying, installation, and mining of refractory 
products); Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, Holland v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs.,  No. 2:13-cv-15487 (S.D.W. Va. July 15, 2014) (selling and servicing 
motor vehicles); Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, Hastings Auto. v. Sebelius, 
No. 0:14-cv-00265-PAM-JJG (D. Minn. May 28, 2014) (automotive dealership); 
Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, Stinson Elec. v. Sebelius, No. 14-CV-00830-
PJS-JJG (D. Minn. Apr. 30, 2014) (electrical services); Order Granting Preliminary 
Injunction, Stewart v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-1879-RCL (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2014) (archi-
tect, design and construction service firm); Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, 
C.W. Zumbiel Co. v. U. S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:13-cv-01611-
RBW (D.D.C. Nov. 27, 2013) (packaging company); Order Granting Preliminary 
Injunction, Doboszenski & Sons, Inc. v. Burwell, No. 13-3148 (D. Minn. Nov. 27, 
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2013) (construction company); Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, Williams v. 
Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-01699-RLW (D.D.C Nov. 19, 2013) (distributor and manufac-
turer of high performance materials for high-voltage electrical, thermal insulation, and 
mechanical applications); Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, Feltl & Co., Inc. v. 
Sebelius, No. 13-cv-02635-DWF-JJK (D. Minn. Nov. 5, 2013) (securities brokerage 
and investment banking company); Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, Midwest 
Fastener Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 13-1337 (D.D.C Oct. 16, 2013) (fastener supplier); 
Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, Barron Indus., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-CV-
1330 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2013) (manufacturer of metal components); Order Granting 
Second Amended Preliminary Injunction, QC Group, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-1726 
(D. Minn. Sept. 11, 2013) (quality control services); Order Granting Preliminary 
Injunction, Willis Law v. Sebelius, No. 13-01124 (D.D.C Aug. 23, 2013) (legal ser-
vices firm); Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, Bindon v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-
1207-EGS (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2013) (manufacturer of any-light aiming systems); Order 
Granting Preliminary Injunction, Ozinga v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
No. 1:13-cv-3292-TMD (N.D. Ill. July 16, 2013) (concrete company); Order Granting 
Preliminary Injunction, SMA, LLC v. Sebelius, No. 13-CV-01375-ADM-LIB (D. 
Minn. July 8, 2013) (agricultural/industrial construction company); Order Granting 
Preliminary Injunction, Johnson Welded Prods., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-00609-
ESH (D.D.C. May 24, 2013) (air reservoir manufacturer); Order Granting Voluntary 
Dismissal, M & N Plastics, Inc., v. Sebelius, 2:13-cv-12036-VAR-DRG (E.D. Mich. 
May 24, 2013) (supplier of custom injection molding products); Order Granting Pre-
liminary Injunction, Hart Elec., LLC v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-CV-02253 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 
18, 2013) (manufacturer of wire harnesses, battery cables, and electrical components); 
Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, Hall v. Sebelius, No. 13-0295 (D. Minn. Apr. 
2, 2013) (manufacturer of replacement parts); Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, 
Bick Holdings, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 4:13-cv-00462-AGF (E.D. Mo. Apr. 1, 2013) 
(data center consulting, design, maintenance, service and cleaning business, and in-
formation technology consulting for health care providers); Order Granting Prelimi-
nary Injunction, Lindsay, Rappaport & Postel LLC. v. Sebelius, No. 13 C 1210 (N.D. 
Ill. Mar. 20, 2013) (law firm); Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, Sioux Chief 
Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-0036-CV-W-ODS (W.D. Mo. Feb. 28, 2013) 
(manufacturer of plumbing products); Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, Yep v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 12-cv-06756 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2013) 
(health care company); Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, Sioux Chief Mfg. Co., 
Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-0036-CV-W-ODS (W.D. Mo. Feb. 28, 2013) (manufacturer 
of plumbing products). 
  Denying Preliminary Relief: MK Chambers Co. v. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., No. 13-11379, 2013 WL 5182435 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2013) (denying pre-
liminary injunction) (manufacturer of automotive parts); Mersino Mgmt. Co. v. Sebe-
lius, No. 13-CV-11296, 2013 WL 3546702 (E.D. Mich. July 11, 2013) (denying pre-
liminary injunction) (pumping services). 
  Rulings Other than Preliminary Injunction: Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 
(7th Cir. 2013) (holding that the contraception mandate substantially burdened plain-
tiffs) (contractors); Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, Infrastructure Alts., Inc. v. 
Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-00031-RJJ (W.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2013) (water operations 
services); Monaghan v. Sebelius, No. 12-15488, 2013 WL 3212597 (E.D. Mich. June 
26, 2013) (granting motion to stay the case) (office park for corporations and property 
management company); Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-5018, 
2013 WL 2395168 (D.C. Cir. May 3, 2013) (granting voluntary dismissal and dis-
11
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In a path-breaking decision, the Court held 5-4 that RFRA applies to 
closely-held, for-profit entities and that the contraception mandate substan-
tially burdened the “ability of the objecting parties to conduct business in 
accordance with their religious beliefs.”52  The Court noted that such entities 
are vehicles through which people of faith participate in the economic life of 
the nation.53  Indeed, both Justice Alito for the majority and Justice Kennedy 
in concurrence made clear that RFRA performed the critical task of prevent-
ing the exclusion of religious people from the economy.54  The Court held 
that, under RFRA, the burden caused by the mandate was not a permissible 
one: although the mandate served a compelling governmental interest, the 
government had failed to meet the least restrictive alternative test.55  The 
Court’s reasoning pointed to the accommodation that HHS had crafted for 
religious nonprofits (the “HHS Accommodation”) and its possible extension 
to the for-profit context.56 
To put the HHS Accommodation in context, it is important to note that 
the contraception mandate itself contained an exemption for church employ-
ers.57  This was a narrow autonomy-based exemption for churches and their 
close affiliates.58  Many religious nonprofits with objections to the contracep-
tion coverage – including charities, colleges, and hospitals – demanded to be 
included in this exemption.59  But instead of expanding the exemption, feder-
 
missing the case) (Christian publisher); Tonn & Blank Constr., LLC v. Sebelius, 968 
F. Supp. 2d 990 (N.D. Ind. 2013) (holding that temporary stay was proper) (contrac-
tors). 
  Filing Only: Complaint, Mersino Dewatering, Inc. v. Sebelius, Case No. 
1:13-cv-01329-RLW (D.D.C Sept. 3, 2013) (pumping services). 
 52. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770-72, 2777-85.  The decision is path-breaking 
not only because of the treatment of for-profits but also because of the Court’s defer-
ence to Plaintiffs on the issue of moral complicity, a topic outside the scope of this 
article.  Note also that Justices Breyer and Kagan did not join the other dissenters on 
the question of RFRA's applicability to for-profits. 
 53. Id. at 2783. 
 54. Id. at 2760; id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 55. Id. at 2780-81 (majority opinion).  Justice Kennedy joined the majority opin-
ion but also wrote a separate concurrence.  Id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  He 
concluded that the government had established a compelling governmental interest.  
Id. at 2785-86. 
 56. Id. at 2781-82 (majority opinion).  On August 22, 2014, HHS proposed regu-
lations that do just this.  See Women’s Preventive Services Coverage and Non-Profit 
Religious Organizations, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-
FAQs/womens-preven-02012013.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2015). 
 57. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2763. 
 58. Id.  The initial religious employer exemption was amended for clarity, but it 
did not expand its intended beneficiaries.  See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., supra note 56. 
 59. See Jonathan T. Tan, Comment, Nonprofit Organizations, For-Profit Corpo-
rations, and the HHS Mandate: Why the Mandate Does Not Satisfy RFRA’s Require-
12
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al regulators crafted a novel solution: the HHS Accommodation, which re-
quires the nonprofit’s insurer (but not the nonprofit itself) to provide the ob-
jectionable coverage directly and separately to employees, in an attempt to 
promote both religious liberty of the employer and the government’s cover-
age goals for the employees.60  In contrast to church and nonprofit employers, 
for-profit employers were not given any kind of religious accommodation, 
which prompted numerous closely-held businesses to challenge the man-
date.61  Given the existence of the HHS Accommodation for nonprofits, the 
Hobby Lobby Court found that “HHS itself has demonstrated that it has at its 
disposal an approach that is less restrictive than requiring employers to fund 
contraceptive methods that violate their religious beliefs.”62  With an exten-
sion of the HHS Accommodation to for-profits, the Court found that “[t]he 
effect . . . on the women employed by [the objecting companies] would be 
precisely zero.  Under that accommodation, these women would still be enti-
tled to all FDA-approved contraceptives without cost-sharing.”63  Under this 
reasoning, neither Justice Alito’s majority opinion nor Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence analyzed the scenario in which a straightforward exemption for 
employers would leave thousands of women without contraceptive coverage 
while their peers – employed at other businesses – would receive coverage. 
 
ments, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1301 (2013); see also, Letter from Anthony R. Picarello, 
Jr., Assoc. Gen. Sec’y & Gen. Counsel, U.S. Conf. of Catholic Bishops, to the Dept. 
of Health & Human Servs. 1-4 (May 15, 2012), available at http://www.usccb.org/
about/general-counsel/rulemaking/upload/comments-on-advance-notice-of-proposed-
rulemaking-on-preventive-services-12-05-15.pdf. 
 60. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2763.  For nonprofits that are self-insured, the 
third-party administrator will provide the coverage.  Timothy Jost, Implementing 
Health Reform: New Accommodations for Employers on Contraceptive Coverage, 
HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Aug. 22, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/08/22/imp-
lementing-health-reform-new-accommodations-for-employers-on-contraceptive-
coverage. 
 61. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762-63; see also sources cited supra note 
51.  There had been some consideration of for-profit coverage during the lengthy 
comment periods.  Initially, the Obama administration refused to expand the religious 
employer exemption and instead proposed an accommodation that would allow non-
exempted nonprofit religious organizations with religious objections to contracep-
tive/sterilization coverage to avoid cost sharing for those services.  See Group Health 
Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Un-
der the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 
2012) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).  A month later the administration sought com-
ment on ways to structure this proposed accommodation and asked specifically for 
comments regarding “which religious organizations should be eligible for the ac-
commodation and whether, as some religious stakeholders have suggested, for-profit 
religious employers with such objections should be considered as well.”  Certain 
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 16501, 16504 (Mar. 
21, 2012) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
 62. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782. 
 63. Id. at 2760. 
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Although the Court’s analysis was made within the balancing frame-
work of RFRA, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent read the decision as an autonomy 
case.  Justice Ginsburg charged the Court with treating for-profit corporations 
with the same “special solicitude” reserved to churches and religious non-
profits and with ignoring the impacts on women who work for objecting 
companies who will now be deprived of federally granted rights.64  Due to 
uncertainties in extending the HHS Accommodation,65 the dissent was skep-
tical of the majority’s easy resolution and flatly accused it of now allowing 
any kind of commercial enterprise to “opt out of any law (saving only tax 
laws) they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs.”66  
In the dissent’s view, RFRA – when properly applied to “strik[e] sensible 
balances” between free exercise claims and governmental interests67 – would 
yield a win for the government in large part because of “the impact that ac-
commodation may have on [thousands of] third parties who do not share the 
corporation owners’ religious faith.”68 
Under the balancing approach, the relevance of negative impacts on 
identifiable persons resulting from religious exemptions is well-settled in the 
law.  Hobby Lobby argued that, with an exemption from the contraception 
mandate, its employees would suffer no “cognizable harm, because nobody is 
entitled to a ‘benefit’ from a regulatory scheme that violates RFRA.”69  But 
 
 64. See id. at 2802-03 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  The quoted language comes 
from Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 
694, 706 (2012), a recent Supreme Court decision that recognized broad autonomy 
protection for churches on employment decisions vis-à-vis ministers.  See discussion 
infra Part II.A. 
 65. The Court did not decide whether the HHS Accommodation “complies with 
RFRA for purposes of all religious claims” (referring to the pending challenges from 
nonprofits), and also raises the option of government providing the contraceptive 
coverage.  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782.  Moreover, the plaintiffs never expressly 
agreed to the HHS Accommodation as an acceptable alternative.  Id. at 2803 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting). 
 66. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  The Hobby Lob-
by Court noted that religious exemptions from federal tax laws would not be granted.  
Id. at 2784 (majority opinion) (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-60 
(1982) (holding that court-mandated exemptions would completely undermine the 
comprehensive tax system, which advances a compelling governmental interest in the 
least restrictive manner)). 
 67. See id. at 2791 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  RFRA’s compelling interest test 
was intended in its language to “strik[e] sensible balances between religious liberty 
and competing prior governmental interests.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-(a)(5) (2012). 
 68. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  The dissent 
concluded that “in view of what Congress sought to accomplish, i.e., comprehensive 
preventive care for women furnished through employer-based health plans, none of 
the proffered alternatives would satisfactorily serve the compelling interests to which 
Congress responded.”  Id. at 2803. 
 69. Brief for Respondents at 54-55, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 
13-354) 2014 WL 546899, at *55 (“Any time a statute takes the form of a mandate 
14
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the very determination of a RFRA violation must take into account the pro-
jected impact of the exemption.  The Supreme Court, in Gonzales v. O Centro 
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, noted that the degree to which the 
exemption undermines the governmental goal is at the core of RFRA’s strict 
scrutiny test.70  And, in Cutter v. Wilkinson, the Court fully expected lower 
courts interpreting a RFRA-like sister statute to apply strict scrutiny in a way 
that was “measured” so as not to “override other significant interests.”71  In-
deed, courts typically resist crafting exemptions (or interpreting legislative 
exemptions) in ways that destabilize and undermine statutory and regulatory 
schemes.72  As Professor Perry Dane has noted, the contraception mandate 
“protects specific third parties, and religious liberty claims are always at their 
weakest when they prejudice the rights and interests of third parties.”73  This 
is why the Hobby Lobby dissenters challenged the Court to decide “whether 
accommodating [the RFRA] claim risks depriving others of rights accorded 
them by the laws of the United States.”74  It is also why the majority empha-
sized the specificity of its holding: that the HHS Accommodation “constitutes 
 
that party A must do something for party B, granting a RFRA exemption . . . will 
make Party B worse off.  But there is no reason whatsoever to treat exemptions from 
such Peter-to-Paul mandates as uniquely disfavored under RFRA.”) 
 70. 546 U.S. 418, 431 (2006) (requiring courts interpreting RFRA to “look[] 
beyond broadly formulated interests justifying the general applicability of govern-
ment mandates and scrutinize[] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to 
particular religious claimants” (emphasis added)). 
 71. 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005).  In addition, “adequate account” must be taken of 
“the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries.”  Id. at 
720.  Cutter involved RLUIPA, which contains language similar to RFRA.  See dis-
cussion supra note 49. 
 72. See generally, e.g., Angela C. Carmella, Responsible Freedom Under the 
Religion Clauses: Exemptions, Legal Pluralism, and the Common Good, 110 W. VA. 
L. REV. 403 (2007). 
 73. Perry Dane, Doctrine and Deep Structure in the Contraception Mandate De-
bate 4 (July 21, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2296635. 
 74. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  The dissenters 
also asserted that exemptions “must not significantly impinge on the interests of third 
parties.”  Id. at 2790.  The Court agreed that impacts must be taken into account, but 
noted that it cannot be the case that any government program that benefits some class 
of persons automatically creates a “third party harm” if a corporation seeks an exemp-
tion, regardless of the magnitude of the burden on the claimant.  See id. at 2781 n.37 
(majority opinion) (“[I]t could not reasonably be maintained that any burden on reli-
gious exercise, no matter how onerous and no matter how readily the government 
interest could be achieved through alternative means, is permissible under RFRA so 
long as the relevant legal obligation requires the religious adherent to confer a benefit 
on  third parties. . . . By framing any Government regulation as benefitting a third 
party, the Government could turn all regulations into entitlements to which nobody 
could object on religious grounds, rendering RFRA meaningless.”). 
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an alternative that achieves all of the Government’s aims while providing 
greater respect for religious liberty.”75 
It is critical that Hobby Lobby not be read broadly as a grant of autono-
my protection to for-profit corporations.  Surely it is a path-breaking decision, 
but it need not be a dam-breaking one.  To constrain Hobby Lobby, it should 
be quite enough that the case was argued and decided under RFRA – a statute 
that embodies the balancing approach.76  Going forward, the case should be 
interpreted to mean that for-profit free exercise claims should be adjudicated 
(if they are adjudicated at all) within a balancing framework, with full atten-
tion to impacts on identifiable individuals and groups.77  In fact, the Court’s 
recent decision in Holt v. Hobbs unanimously reinforced the notion that 
RFRA requires a balancing and an impacts inquiry.78  In that case, which 
interpreted a RFRA-like “sister statute,”79 the Court pointed to both O Centro 
and Hobby Lobby to demonstrate its consistent understanding that statutory 
balancing requires it to “scrutiniz[e] the asserted harm of granting specific 
exemptions to particular religious claimants . . . .”80  To depart from this 
highly structured approach and adopt “autonomy” in its place would intro-
duce a disastrous expansion of a doctrine that is meant to be limited in scope 
and application. 
 
 75. Id. at 2759. 
 76. This Article does not respond to the arguments of the dissent and other 
commentators that the Court has imported autonomy considerations into the RFRA 
interpretation.  As long as RFRA provides the framework for the arguments, courts 
are obligated to engage in a balancing and to take impacts of exemptions into account.  
As Andrew Koppelman has written, “[I]f you object to the mandate on the basis of 
Hosanna-Tabor [an autonomy case] rather than RFRA, you are relying on the broad 
idea of freedom of the church.”  Koppelman, supra note 27, at 163. 
 77. I would assume that courts might now extend any of the available state and 
federal sources of strict scrutiny balancing, or any other comparable balancing ap-
proach, to for-profit entities by analogy to Hobby Lobby.  See supra note 49.  Of 
course, the applicability of balancing does not indicate success on the merits.  And 
where balancing is unavailable, this means that the only avenue for protection is legis-
lative or regulatory exemption, which may or may not be politically feasible. 
 78. 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015) (holding that prison grooming policy violates RLUIPA 
because prison failed to demonstrate its prohibition on half-inch beard is the least 
restrictive means to furthering its compelling interest in prison security). 
 79. Id. at 859.  Holt involved an interpretation of the prisoner provisions of 
RLUIPA, which contain the identical strict scrutiny test and an identical definition of 
religious exercise as that contained in RFRA.  Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1, 2000bb-2; 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1, 2000cc-5 (2014); see also discussion supra note 49. 
 80. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 863 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014) (quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431 (2006))). 
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II.  THE APPLICABILITY OF THE AUTONOMY DOCTRINE TO CHURCHES 
AND RELIGIOUS NONPROFITS 
One of the most significant functions of the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment is to ensure the autonomy of religious institutions – that is, the 
ability of churches to “manag[e] their own institutions free of government 
interference.”81  Autonomy under the Free Exercise Clause protects decisions 
regarding the religious identity and mission of those institutions we would 
consider to be jurisgenerative.82  Freedom for such institutions to define and 
constitute themselves in order to generate and reinforce norms, in turn, fur-
thers the religious exercise of individuals because it protects their voluntary 
decisions to affiliate with (or exit) religious communities.  Obviously this 
autonomy is not without limits, but it is capacious enough to provide church-
es with the freedom to “select their own leaders, define their own doctrines, 
resolve their own disputes, and run their own institutions.”83  The Establish-
ment Clause, which first and foremost expresses a fundamental jurisdictional 
independence of church and state, also bolsters this notion of autonomy: the 
state is not competent to “set up a church”84 – to be involved in clergy selec-
tion, doctrinal determinations and ecclesiastical decisions.  As a consequence, 
churches are free to function as significant non-state mediating institutions in 
civil society.  The recognition of church autonomy thus furthers individual 
and collective free exercise, a healthy institutional independence of church 
and state, and a more diverse and vibrant civil society. 
The importance of autonomy reveals itself wherever the core religious 
identity of a church might be vulnerable to state interference.  Its origins can 
be traced to a Supreme Court decision made shortly after the Civil War that 
recognized that civil courts were incompetent to adjudicate religious ques-
tions, and so must defer to religious tribunals on matters of religious law; 
church members had impliedly consented to such internal church processes.85  
Indeed, in a case in which a state court set aside a church’s decision to de-
frock a bishop and ordered the church to reinstate him, the Supreme Court 
found this “an impermissible rejection of the decisions of the highest ecclesi-
astical tribunal of this hierarchical church,” even though the church’s conduct 
had been appallingly arbitrary.86  While a complex body of “church autono-
 
 81. Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The 
Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1373, 1373 (1981). 
 82. See id. at 1388-89. 
 83. Id. at 1389 (internal citations omitted). 
 84. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). 
 85. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 732 (1872). 
 86. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U. S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 
708 (1976) (reversing decision of the Illinois Supreme Court to reinstate defrocked 
bishop to former position on grounds that church did not follow its own procedures 
for removal and holding that the church’s highest tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction 
over religious controversy). 
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my” jurisprudence has evolved over time to address church schisms and 
property disputes, the broader autonomy concept allows churches the “power 
to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church gov-
ernment as well as those of faith and doctrine.”87  The doctrine ensures that 
state and federal governments steer clear of church beliefs; decisions regard-
ing structure, governance, and mission; issues of church membership and 
leadership; many aspects of the church employer-employee relationship; and 
church decisions regarding sponsorship or affiliations with other institutions, 
charitable and educational, formal and informal.88  Even the constitutionality 
of tax exemptions for churches is grounded in the notion that an exemption 
preserves the jurisdictional independence of church and state, as taxation of 
churches poses a far greater risk of excessive state entanglement in the life of 
churches than does the exemption.89 
In the context of these protections for churches, and often for religious 
nonprofits as well, we find exemptions that have real, and often negative, 
impacts on identifiable individuals – employees, religious leaders, and mem-
bers – whose participation in the life of the church may be conditioned upon 
“conforming to certain religious tenets.”90  In connection with this freedom in 
the employment context, Justice Brennan provided reasons for why this must 
be acceptable: 
The [church’s] authority to engage in this process of self-definition in-
evitably involves what we normally regard as infringement on [an in-
dividual’s] free exercise rights, since a religious organization is able to 
condition employment in certain activities on subscription to particu-
lar religious tenets.  We are willing to countenance the imposition of 
such a condition because we deem it vital that, if certain activities 
constitute part of a religious community’s practice, then a religious 
organization should be able to require that only members of its com-
munity perform those activities.91 
In certain circumstances, the autonomy concept has also allowed reli-
gious institutions to tailor the provision of social, educational and health ser-
vices to the public in ways that comport with their beliefs.  While the applica-
tion of autonomy considerations tends to be more nuanced and less consistent 
– and more contested – in this context (given the greater engagement with 
 
 87. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 
344 U.S. 94, 116, 119 (1952) (striking state law that changed the internal governance 
structure of church from what had been determined by hierarchical authorities, forc-
ing a change of control of religious matters “from one church authority to another”). 
 88. See Bryce v. Episcopal Church in Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 655 (10th 
Cir. 2002) (citing Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116-17). 
 89. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970). 
 90. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 340 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 91. Id. at 342-43. 
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those outside the faith community), autonomy continues to ground many such 
accommodations.  Whatever the context, autonomy-based exemptions will 
result in impacts on identifiable person and groups who will be without re-
course to complain and who may suffer harms that are without legal redress.92 
A.  Clergy and Other Employees 
The Supreme Court unanimously and enthusiastically reaffirmed the au-
tonomy doctrine as applied to the selection of ministers, broadly defined, in 
the recent case of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School 
v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, where the Court recognized a 
robust “ministerial exception” to anti-discrimination laws.93  That doctrine 
prohibits government interference in the selection of its ministers, which is 
“an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church 
itself.”94  Cheryl Perich, a teacher at a church-sponsored elementary school, 
had been fired from a position that required a “call” from the church.95  
Perich sued the church for reinstatement and damages on the grounds that the 
church had fired her in retaliation for threatening to bring suit under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act.96  The government urged the Court to reject 
the concept of the ministerial exception, which, up until this case, had been 
developed in the federal courts of appeals.97  In its place, the government 
argued that the generalized concept of “freedom of association” would suffi-
ciently protect churches from government intervention in religious affairs.98 
The Court found that Perich’s duties – as they were regarded and func-
tioned in the life of the church – made her a “minister” within the meaning of 
the exception.99  The Court also rejected the government’s argument, declar-
ing that it “cannot accept the remarkable view that the Religion Clauses have 
nothing to say about the religious organization’s freedom to select its own 
 
 92. See generally Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from 
Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781 (2007); see also Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 
654, 678 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[C]hurch-autonomy principle operates as a complete im-
munity, or very nearly so.”). 
 93. 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012) (holding the ministerial exception to be an affirm-
ative defense, not jurisdictional bar, to discrimination claims; the Court did not so 
hold as to other claims, such as breach of contract). 
 94. Id. at 707. 
 95. Id. at 700.  “Once called, a teacher receive[d] the formal title ‘Minister of 
Religion, Commissioned.’  A commissioned minister serve[d] for an open-ended 
term; at Hosanna-Tabor, a call could be rescinded only for cause and by a superma-
jority vote of the congregation.”  Id. at 699. 
 96. Id. at 701. 
 97. Id. at 705-06. 
 98. Id. at 706. 
 99. Id. at 708. 
19
Carmella: Carmella: After Hobby Lobby
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
400 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
ministers.”100  The Court explained that Perich’s action “intrudes upon more 
than a mere employment decision”: 
Such action interferes with the internal governance of the church, de-
priving the church of control over the selection of those who will per-
sonify its beliefs.  By imposing an unwanted minister, the state in-
fringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s 
right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.  Ac-
cording the state the power to determine which individuals will minis-
ter to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which pro-
hibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.101 
In short, allowing the teacher to seek legal recourse would constitute 
government interference in “faith and mission.”102  Thus, the Hosanna-Tabor 
Court concluded that “[b]oth Religion Clauses bar the government from inter-
fering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.”103 
For clergy and any employees who are considered “ministers,”104 there 
is a startling lack of legal protection from virtually any kind of employment 
discrimination.105  A church could engage in actual discrimination, having 
nothing to do with its exercise of religion, but the employee who is harmed 
would have no recourse.  Indeed, ministerial exception cases usually involve 
allegations of discrimination based on race,106 sex,107 pregnancy,108 age,109 
 
 100. Id. at 706. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 707. 
 103. Id. at 702.  The Court then clarified that “[t]he Establishment Clause prevents 
the Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it 
from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own.”  Id. at 703. 
 104. A broad definition has been developed in the lower federal courts.  See, e.g., 
Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 309 (4th Cir. 
2004) (including kosher supervisor at Jewish nursing home within definition); EEOC 
v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 802 (4th Cir. 2000) (in-
cluding church music director within definition).  Justice Alito’s concurrence in Ho-
sanna-Tabor suggested a functional definition that would apply the exception to “po-
sitions of substantial religious importance.”  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 712 (Alito, 
J., concurring). 
 105. The Court did say, however, that “[t]oday we hold only that the ministerial 
exception bars [an employment discrimination] suit.  We express no view on whether 
the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging 
breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers.”  Id. at 710 (ma-
jority opinion). 
 106. See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 209-10 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding 
that ministerial exception barred priest’s race discrimination claim against diocese); 
Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 614-15 (Ky. 2014) (hold-
ing that ministerial exception barred race discrimination claim, but contract breach 
claim could proceed). 
 107. See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 
1164, 1165-72 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that ministerial exception barred sex and race 
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sexual orientation110 and disability.111  We also see this story repeated outside 
the church context, as courts have applied the ministerial exception to reli-
giously affiliated nonprofits like universities,112 hospitals113 and nursing 
homes114 on the theory that “an entity can provide secular services and still 
have substantial religious character.”115  Yet dismissing these claims without 
further examination is required by both Religion Clauses.116  For over forty 
years, courts have reaffirmed that the harmful effects of unredressed discrim-
ination are simply outweighed by the necessary institutional freedom for a 
church or nonprofit to define its identity, faith and mission.117  If we are to 
have vibrant religious communities and robust individual free exercise, reli-
gious institutions must have the ability to define and constitute, to perpetuate 
 
discrimination claims by woman denied pastoral care internship and position on pas-
toral staff); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 556-61 (5th Cir. 1972) (hold-
ing that court lacked jurisdiction over sex discrimination claim because claim in-
volved ecclesiastical practices). 
 108. See, e.g., Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of United Methodist 
Church, 173 F.3d 343, 345-51 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal of pregnancy and 
sex discrimination claims because of ministerial exception). 
 109. See, e.g., Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 180 (5th Cir. 
2012) (holding that ministerial exception barred age discrimination claim of music 
teacher). 
 110. See, e.g., Bryce v. Episcopal Church in Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 658 
n.2 (10th Cir. 2002) (discussing ministerial exception in larger context of church 
autonomy). 
 111. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 
S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012) (holding that ministerial exception barred disability-based 
claim employment discrimination brought by “called” teacher, who fell within defini-
tion of “minister”). 
 112. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 113. See, e.g., Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(barring ADA claims of resident in clinical pastoral education program at religiously 
affiliated hospital); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 
360 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that sex and age discrimination claims of chaplain at 
religiously affiliated hospital were barred by Establishment Clause with doctrinal 
overlap with ministerial exception). 
 114. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 309-11 
(4th Cir. 2004) (barring kosher supervisor at predominantly Jewish nursing home 
from asserting Fair Labor Standards Act wage claim and holding that a religious non-
profit is a “religious institution” for purposes of ministerial exception whenever its 
“mission is marked by clear or obvious religious characteristics”). 
 115. Id. at 310.  But see Caroline Mala Corbin, Hobby Lobby and Corporate Reli-
gious Liberty, 30 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2015) (arguing that church auton-
omy is limited to churches and is based on the notion of voluntary association, so that 
it should not be applied outside this context), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2327919. 
 116. See Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 457, 460. 
 117. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 
694, 710 (2012). 
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and reform, themselves.  And so it is with many other exemptions that are 
either explicitly or implicitly driven by autonomy protections: their negative 
impacts on identifiable persons and groups are ignored. 
Even employees who are not considered “ministers” can find themselves 
without legal recourse in cases of religious discrimination.  Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination, and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), which prohibits disability dis-
crimination in a variety of contexts, including employment, both contain au-
tonomy-based exemptions for religious entities.118  Title VII’s exemption 
allows “religious organizations” to discriminate on the basis of religion in 
favor of their own members or in favor of a particular faith, regardless of the 
religious or secular nature of the employment.119  The exemption protects 
eligible religious organizations from all employment-related challenges, 
whether the claims involve hiring, discharge, harassment or retaliation.120  In 
addition to churches, many religious nonprofits qualify for the exemption;121 
 
 118. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting these 
exemptions as autonomy-based in contrast to RFRA’s balancing approach).  Accord-
ing to the court, the Title VII and ADA exemptions are considered “legislative appli-
cations of the church autonomy doctrine.”  Id. at 678. 
 119. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).  Title VII gives employees the right to be 
free from religious discrimination, the right to reasonable religious accommodation 
and the right to be free from a religiously hostile work environment.  See id.  The 
exemption for religious entities provides: “This subchapter shall not apply . . . to a 
religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to 
the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected 
with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or so-
ciety of its activities.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012).  The Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (ADA) also contains a similar exemption for religious entities: 
This subchapter shall not prohibit a religious corporation, association, educa-
tional institution, or society from giving preference in employment to individ-
uals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by 
such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activi-
ties. . . . Under this subchapter, a religious organization may require that all 
applicants and employees conform to the religious tenets of such organization. 
42 U.S.C. § 12113(d)(1)-(2) (2012); see also Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 
252, 258 (3d Cir. 2007) (remanding for determination of whether Quaker school falls 
within exemption). 
 120. See, e.g., Kennedy v. St. Joseph’s Ministries, 657 F.3d 189, 192-94 (4th Cir. 
2011) (holding that the term “employment” for religious organization exemption 
under Title VII is not limited to hiring and firing decisions). 
 121. See, e.g., Saeemodarae v. Mercy Health Servs., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (N.D. 
Iowa 2006).  In Saeemodarae, a nonprofit hospital founded by the Sisters of Mercy 
was found to be a religious corporation under the Title VII exemption.  Id. at 1037-38.  
Its mission was to “continue the healing ministry of the Catholic Church.”  Id. at 
1027.  Under its bylaws, the hospital had to conduct itself in accord with church 
guidelines and the Bishops’ Ethical and Religious Directives.  Id. at 1028.  During 
orientation, new employees learned of the hospital’s Catholic history, identity, and 
mission; the hospital had a pastoral care department with on-site chaplains and daily 
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they do not have to be sponsored by or affiliated with a particular church.122  
Moreover, the qualifying “religious organization,” even if church-sponsored, 
does not have to require church membership in order to make employment 
decisions on religious grounds.123  Indeed, some courts have defined the ex-
emption broadly so that it applies to cases in which employees have failed to 
comport their personal behavior to the religious employer’s rules of conduct 
and moral standards.124 
The main decision regarding Title VII’s exemption is Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos.125  In that case, employees working at church-affiliated facilities – 
including a janitor and a seamstress – were fired because they were no longer 
members in good standing of the Mormon Church.126   They challenged the 
Title VII religious exemption as a violation of the Establishment Clause on 
the grounds that their jobs were secular and that churches should be subject to 
anti-discrimination laws with respect to such secular positions.127  The Court 
rejected the argument.128  Justice White justified the broad exemption on au-
tonomy grounds: it “alleviate[d] significant governmental interference with 
the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious 
 
Mass in the chapel; all of its statuary, symbols, decoration, iconography, and artwork 
identified the hospital as Catholic.  Id.  The court took all of these facts into account 
to hold that the nature and atmosphere of the hospital were “undisputedly religious.”  
Id. at 1037. 
 122. See, e.g., Spencer v. World Vision, 633 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) 
(finding charity that was not church-affiliated eligible for the religious Title VII ex-
emption).  For a variety of judicial tests to determine qualifying religious organiza-
tions, see Roger W. Dyer, Note, Qualifying for the Title VII Religious Organization 
Exemption: Federal Circuits Split over Proper Test, 76 MO. L. REV. 545 (2010). 
 123. See, e.g., Lown v. Salvation Army, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 223, 246-52 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that Title VII exemption barred employment discrimination 
claim brought by social service employees who refused to give information about 
church membership); see also Saeemodarae, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1038 (holding that 
Title VII exemption applied to religiously affiliated hospital even though hospital did 
not hire co-religionists exclusively). 
 124. See, e.g., Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 658 (6th Cir. 
1999) (discussing issue of fact precluding summary judgment as to whether teacher 
was terminated because of pregnancy, which would be a Title VII violation, or be-
cause of school’s religiously based moral stand against non-marital sexual activity as 
applied to all employees, which would fall within exemption); Little v. Wuerl, 929 
F.2d 944, 951 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that Catholic school operated within the ex-
emption when it fired Protestant teacher who had entered into a canonically invalid 
marriage with a Catholic). 
 125. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
 126. Amos v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, 594 F. Supp. 791, 796 (D. Utah 1984), rev’d, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
 127. Id. at 331. 
 128. Id. at 336. 
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missions.”129  Justice Brennan’s concurrence noted that government decisions 
regarding the religious-secular distinction would involve case-by-case in-
quires resulting in “excessive government entanglement . . . and [would] cre-
ate the danger of chilling religious activity.”130  He went on to justify the ex-
emption in terms of religious autonomy: 
For many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large 
measure from participation in a larger religious community.  Such a 
community represents an ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an or-
ganic entity not reducible to a mere aggregation of individuals.  De-
termining that certain activities are in furtherance of an organiza-
tion’s religious mission, and that only those committed to that mission 
should conduct them, is thus a means by which a religious community 
defines itself.  Solicitude for a church’s ability to do so reflects the 
idea that furtherance of the autonomy of religious organizations often 
furthers individual religious freedom as well.131 
For both the ministerial exception and the broad Title VII exemption, 
the fundamental right of the church to define and constitute itself – and to 
choose those who will be part of that effort – is protected, even at great cost 
(reputational, financial, and other) to individual employees and potential em-
ployees. 
Employees of church-affiliated entities may also find themselves with-
out labor law protection, in particular without the protection of collective 
bargaining and the ability to unionize.  In National Labor Relations Board v. 
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, the Court read the National Labor Relations Act 
to not authorize board jurisdiction over lay faculty at church schools in order 
to avoid the constitutional issues.132  The Seventh Circuit had concluded on 
the merits that National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) jurisdiction “would 
impinge upon the freedom of church authorities to shape and direct teaching 
in accord with the requirements of their religion” and to control the “religious 
mission of the schools” in violation of the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses.133  In contrast, the Supreme Court avoided reaching the merits, not-
ing that “[i]t is not only the conclusions that may be reached by the Board 
which may impinge on rights guaranteed by the Religion Clauses, but also the 
very process of inquiry leading to findings and conclusions.”134  The decision 
was driven in particular by autonomy concerns over government entangle-
ment in the relationship between the church and teachers in its schools.135  
 
 129. Id. at 335. 
 130. Id. at 344 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 131. Id. at 342 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
 132. 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979). 
 133. Id. at 496. 
 134. Id. at 502. 
 135. Avoiding entanglement was a key provision of Establishment Clause inter-
pretation, particularly before the 1990s, and a proxy for the jurisdictional nature of 
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Further, in the context of higher education, courts have denied NLRB’s juris-
diction, making it impossible for faculty to unionize at religiously-affiliated 
colleges and universities.136 
B.  Members and Dissenters 
In addition to choices regarding clergy and employees, decisions regard-
ing membership are central to a church as it defines and constitutes itself.  It 
should therefore come as no surprise that autonomy considerations justify 
impacts on persons in the context of church membership.  Of course churches 
usually “open their doors to all.”137  Regardless of a church’s openness or 
exclusivity, however, no court will tell a church that it must accept or rein-
state a particular person as a member, or tell a church that it must reconsider a 
decision to exclude or change the status of a member.  And yet the harm suf-
fered by those without recourse is unmistakable.  A particularly heart-rending 
case is Anderson v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, in 
which a married couple who had been active in the Jehovah’s Witness com-
munity for decades was expelled, or “disfellowshipped,” because the wife 
was found guilty of causing unrest and division within the church when she 
publicly criticized the way the church was handling sex abuse claims.138  As a 
result of the expulsion, the couple was “shunned” by other church members 
(including family).  Their suit for $20 million in damages on multiple tort 
claims – including defamation, false light invasion of privacy, interference 
with business, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, intentional infliction of emo-
tion distress, and wrongful disfellowshipping – was dismissed in its entirety 
on church autonomy grounds.139  As members, the plaintiffs had implicitly 
 
proper church-state relations.  Entanglement was used widely in Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence as the vehicle for recognizing the unique role of religious schools and 
the significant role of all (religious and secular) teachers in advancing religious mis-
sion. 
 136. See, e.g., Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  
NLRB currently asks whether a religiously affiliated university has a “substantial 
religious character” in order to determine if it has jurisdiction for purposes of collec-
tive bargaining.  See id. at 1337.  Because of concerns that such an inquiry could lead 
to entanglement and possible denominational preferences, the court has mandated a 
blanket exemption for all religiously-affiliated universities, without further inquiry, so 
long as they are nonprofit and hold themselves out to be religious institutions.  See id. 
at 1341, 1347 (reasoning that in trying to determine whether a university had a “sub-
stantial religious character,” the NLRB “engaged in the sort of intrusive inquiry that 
Catholic Bishop sought to avoid”); see also Pac. Lutheran Univ. & Serv. Emps. Int’l 
Union, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 (2014), 2014 WL 7330993 (Member Johnson, dissent-
ing) (detailing cases). 
 137. Spencer v. World Vision, 633 F.3d 723, 738 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) 
(O’Scannlain, J., concurring). 
 138. No. M2004-01066-COA-R9-CV, 2007 WL 161035 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 
2007). 
 139. Id. at *1. 
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consented to the church’s rules and governance structure.140  “[T]he freedom 
of religious bodies to determine their own membership is such a fundamental-
ly ecclesiastical matter that courts are prohibited from adjudicating disputes 
over membership or expulsion.”141  Courts cannot review the correctness or 
fairness of such decisions; and the impacts from shunning, including real 
economic impacts resulting from loss of business from customers known 
through church membership, are not cognizable because the practice of shun-
ning is “integrally tied to the decision to expel a member. . . .”142  These 
claims simply could not be “adjudicated without inquiry into the religious 
doctrine and practice of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and without resolution of 
underlying religious controversies.”143 
In addition to expulsion claims, numerous tort claims brought by mem-
bers against churches have been similarly dismissed on autonomy grounds.144  
These are, in the author’s view, unjustified under autonomy considerations, 
yet the hands-off approach persists.145  Attempts to create a standard of care 
for clergy counseling and mental health services, for instance, have been met 
with resistance: no state recognizes “clergy malpractice.”146  Indeed, for a 
very long time, autonomy considerations obstructed negligence claims 
against churches in the clergy sex abuse litigation.147  Although this has erod-
ed in the context of massive scandals involved in moving pedophile priests 
from church to church, some tort claims continue to be dismissed despite 
egregious conduct by church defendants.148 
Some of the most emotionally-charged situations involve members chal-
lenging theological or financial decisions made by the church, which are gen-
 
 140. Id. at *6. 
 141. Id. at *9. 
 142. Id. at *19. 
 143. Id. at *8. 
 144. See, e.g., Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 960-61 
(Cal. 1988). 
 145. Claims of psychological and physical harm should not be dismissed automat-
ically.  See generally Carmella, supra note 21. 
 146. Constance Frisby Fain, Minimizing Liability for Church-Related Counseling 
Services: Clergy Malpractice and First Amendment Religion Clauses, 44 AKRON L. 
REV. 221, 250 (2011) (discussing scope of “clergy malpractice” claim, noting types of 
tort actions allowed to proceed). 
 147. See sources cited supra note 21. 
 148. See, e.g., Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 8-13 
(Tex. 2008) (dismissing claim of physical restraint during youth service).  But see, 
e.g., Gulbraa v. Corp. of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 159 
P.3d 392 (2007) (barring father’s claims via First Amendment for breach of contract, 
promissory estoppel, fraud and misrepresentation for church’s performance of ordina-
tions on children after promising father that no ordination would occur without his 
consent but not barring claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (although 
facts were not developed to support claim)). 
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erally not justiciable.149  As noted above, there exists a long line of cases in-
volving church schisms, where dissenting factions claim to be the “true” 
church and claim rightful ownership of church property.  Dissenters in these 
cases will be turned away because even if they could “prove” that they were 
right on theological grounds, civil courts are not competent to adjudicate such 
questions.150  Beyond these classic dissenters from church doctrine, church 
members or parents of children who attend a religiously affiliated school 
sometimes challenge the legality of a church’s decision to close its sanctuary 
or school.151  While the impassioned criticism and bad publicity occasionally 
pressure a church into changing its decision, there is little that can be done 
through litigation.152 
Likewise, new rights to marry recognized in the civil sphere do not au-
thorize courts to order a church to perform a religious ceremony for a same-
sex couple.153  Under both Religion Clauses, government is powerless to 
compel a church or clergy person to perform a religious ceremony or confer a 
religious privilege.154  This would strike at the heart of a church’s autonomy.  
State statutes that recognize marriage equality typically include a section 
providing that no church or clergy person could ever be required to celebrate, 
 
 149. Disputes regarding property and other “secular” matters are often justiciable 
under the “neutral principles” approach, which does not involve any religious inquiry.  
See generally Jeffrey B. Hassler, Comment, A Multitude of Sins? Constitutional 
Standards for Legal Resolution of Church Property Disputes in a Time of Escalating 
Intradenominational Strife, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 399 (2008). 
 150. See, e.g., Choi v. Sung, 225 P.3d 425, 432 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010); Lamont 
Cmty. Church v. Lamont Christian Reformed Church, 777 N.W.2d 15, 23-24 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2009). 
 151. See sources cited infra note 152. 
 152. See, e.g., Se. Pa. Synod of Evangelical Lutheran Church in Am. v. Meena, 19 
A.3d 1191 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) (court must defer to synod decisions regarding 
church closings); see also Chris Buckley, St. Anthony Group Plans to Oppose Clo-
sure, TRIBLIVE (Mar. 29, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://triblive.com/neighborhoods/your
monvalley/yourmonvalleymore/5851540-74/church-anthony-society#axzz3870In0
AM; Sharon Otterman, Tears for New York’s Catholics as Church Closings Are An-
nounced, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2014, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/11/03/nyregion/new-york-catholics-are-set-to-learn-fate-of-their-parishes.html. 
 153. See, e.g., Mary Schmich, A Church Wedding That Will Not Be, CHI. TRIBUNE 
(May 10, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-05-10/news/ct-schmich-met-
0511-20140510_1_marriage-certificate-wedding-marriage-fairness-act. 
 154. See Eugene Volokh, Can Ministers Who Make a Living by Conducting Wed-
dings Be Required to Conduct Same-Sex Weddings?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 18, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/10/18/can-
ministers-who-make-a-living-by-conducting-weddings-be-required-to-conduct-same-
sex-weddings.  For general autonomy considerations violated by state-compelled 
religious ceremonies, see Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (stating 
that under the Establishment Clause the government must be neutral with respect to 
church attendance and is forbidden from participating in the affairs of churches); 
supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text. 
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solemnize or recognize such a marriage.155  These provisions are politically 
necessary and have the value of clarity,156 but in reality they are redundant.  
While the couple might be able to sue a wedding photographer who refuses 
their business,157 they cannot sue a church that refuses to marry them, regard-
less of the dignitary harm. 
C.  Patients of Religious Health Care Facilities 
Religiously affiliated hospitals, like secular nonprofit and for-profit hos-
pitals, hire professionals, serve the public, receive government monies, and 
are heavily regulated to ensure safety.  It is not surprising, then, that as 
“commercial” nonprofits competing in the same market with nonreligious 
hospitals and treating patients without regard to religious affiliation, religious 
hospitals enjoy only very narrow autonomy protection: they may refuse to 
perform abortions and sterilizations in accordance with their institutional faith 
and mission.158  These provisions are part of a larger set of conscience laws 
enacted to protect anyone – individual or institution – from being coerced 
into participating in these procedures or being penalized for refusing to do 
so.159  Federal law, passed in 1973 in response to Roe v. Wade, and numerous 
state-level conscience clauses, give hospitals the right to refuse to perform 
 
 155. For example, under New York’s exemption, a church “shall not be required 
to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for 
the solemnization of a [same-sex] marriage.”  See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-b(1) 
(McKinney 2011).  Other states have similar provisions.  See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 457:37 (West 2014) (permitting religious organizations and societies to de-
termine who may marry within their faith and exempting them from any requirement 
to provide marriage-related services); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5144(b) (West 2014) 
(“This section does not require a member of the clergy authorized to solemnize a 
marriage . . . to solemnize any marriage.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4501(b) (West 
2014) (maintaining the ability of societies to determine admission and insurance cov-
erage for their members); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502(l) (West 2014) (exempting 
religiously affiliated organizations from being required to provide any marriage-
related services).  Additionally, refusals under these provisions give rise to no private 
or governmental cause of action.  See sources cited supra. 
 156. See, e.g., Frank Gulino, A Match Made in Albany: The Uneasy Wedding of 
Marriage Equality and Religious Liberty, 84-Jan N.Y. ST. B.J. 38, 39 (2012). 
 157. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (ordering 
business refusing to photograph same-sex commitment ceremony to pay money to 
couple that was turned away). 
 158. See, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 30/1(a)-(b) (West 2014); MD. CODE 
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214(b) (West 2014). 
 159. See Angela C. Carmella, For-Profit v. Nonprofit: Does Corporate Form 
Matter? The Question of For-Profit Eligibility for Religious Exemptions Under Con-
science Statutes and the First Amendment, in IS A FOR-PROFIT STRUCTURE A VIABLE 
ALTERNATIVE FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE MINISTRY? 75, 77-80 (2012), available at 
https://law.shu.edu/Health-Law/upload/Catholic-Health-Care-Symposium-
Proceedings.pdf. 
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abortions and sterilizations;160 more recent legislation in some states has ex-
tended these protections to those refusing to provide contraceptive drugs and 
devices.161  Laws regulating physician-assisted suicide, where in place, also 
exempt individual and institutional objectors from participation.162 
These conscience laws protect the autonomy of churches, like the 
Catholic Church, that have defined and constituted themselves over the centu-
ries not only as a worshipping community but also as multiple outreach min-
istries – including health care services – that give concrete expression to faith 
and mission.163  With one-sixth of all hospital patients cared for at Catholic 
hospitals, the Church’s commitment to health care is substantial.164  Obvious-
ly a woman cannot obtain an abortion, sterilization or contraception in Catho-
lic hospitals.165  Other facilities might provide these services, although in 
some communities there may be few or no alternatives.166 
 
 160. Id.  
 161. See generally Catherine Grealis, Note, Religion in the Pharmacy: A Bal-
anced Approach to Pharmacists’ Right to Refuse to Provide Plan B, 97 GEO. L.J. 
1715 (2009). 
 162. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.885 § 4.01(4) (providing that no individual 
or health care facility has a duty to participate in physician-assisted suicide); see also 
Charles H. Baron et al., A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate Physician-
Assisted Suicide, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 33 (1996) (Section 11 of the Model Act, 
Provider’s Freedom of Conscience, states that no individual or health care facility, or 
its staff, can be required to participate). 
 163. As the Catholic Health Association has written, 
Catholic health care providers are participants in the healing ministry of Jesus 
Christ.  Our mission and our ethical standards in health care are rooted in and 
inseparable from the Catholic Church’s teaching about the dignity of the hu-
man person and the sanctity of human life from conception to natural death. . . 
. .  The explicit recognition of the right of Catholic organizations to perform 
their ministries in fidelity to their faith is almost as old as our nation itself. 
Letter from Carol Keehan, President & CEO, Catholic Health Association of the 
United States, to Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (Sept. 22, 2011), availa-
ble at http://ncrnews.org/documents/employerexceptionrelativetopreventiveservices9-
22-11final.pdf.  President & CEO Carol Keehan also noted that President Jefferson 
promised the Ursuline nuns the right to govern their institutions according to their 
own rules and “without interference from the civil authority.”  Id. 
 164. Jerry Filteau, Catholic Hospitals Serve One in Six Patients in the United 
States, NAT’L CATHOLIC REPORTER (Oct. 20, 2010), http://ncronline.org/news/catho-
lic-hospitals-serve-one-six-patients-united-states. 
 165. See Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(holding that refusal of sterilization procedure was legal and hospital was not a state 
actor); Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973) (holding that 
refusal of sterilization procedure was legal and hospital was not a state actor; precipi-
tating passage of federal conscience clause), aff’d, 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975); see 
also Brownfield v. Freeman Marina Hosp., 208 Cal. App. 3d 405, 414 (1989) (dis-
cussing Catholic hospital’s denial of contraception to rape victim and availability of 
malpractice damages).  See generally Steph Sterling & Jessica L. Waters, Beyond 
Religious Refusals: The Case for Protecting Health Care Workers’ Provision of 
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D.  Contested Application of the Autonomy Doctrine 
The previous sections have described the autonomy doctrine and its 
broad categorical exemptions for religious employment and membership de-
cisions, as well as its limited conscience protection for health care providers.  
These sections describe the potential and real consequences to employees, 
members, and patients.  Yet the obvious must be stated: autonomy is at its 
strongest in the context of churches and their close affiliates, where consent 
to those consequences by members and employees can be more easily im-
plied.  Once we move to religious nonprofits, whether or not church-related, 
the appropriateness of the autonomy doctrine becomes more vigorously con-
tested and less evenly applied.  The consent of employees and others is more 
attenuated (or downright absent) in some of the nonprofit employment and 
service contexts.  Indeed, many religious nonprofits whose mission involves 
pursuits that are not exclusively or primarily religious – like health care, edu-
cation, and social services – may not be viewed as warranting the same level 
of identity and missional protection that churches and their close affiliates 
need.  Especially in situations where employees are hired without regard to 
faith, where the public is served, where public monies finance at least some 
part of the operations, and where economic power is comparable to secular 
nonprofit or for-profit actors, religious nonprofits find themselves vulnerable 
to being treated like their nonreligious counterparts.167 
Autonomy is a contested matter even in the Title VII and NLRB con-
texts.168  Although it is true that the religious exemption to Title VII is ap-
plied broadly to eligible institutions, it is significant to note that the definition 
of an eligible religious organization is not settled.169  Federal courts of ap-
peals have developed at least five different tests for determining whether a 
religious organization is eligible for the exemption.170  The Ninth Circuit, for 
instance, refuses to apply the exemption to nonprofits that charge more than a 
nominal fee for services, thereby rendering religious hospitals, day care cen-
 
Abortion Care, 34 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 463 (2011); Cathleen Kaveny, The ACLU 
Takes on the Bishops: Tragedy Leads to a Misguided Lawsuit, COMMONWEAL (Dec. 
18, 2013), https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/aclu-takes-bishops. 
 166. The literature on this issue is substantial.  See generally Kathleen M. 
Boozang, Deciding the Fate of Religious Hospitals in the Emerging Health Care 
Market, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1429, 1447-51 (1995); Catherine A. White, Note, Crisis of 
Conscience: Reconciling Religious Health Care Providers’ Beliefs and Patients’ 
Rights, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1703, 1749 (1999). 
 167. See sources cited infra notes 177-207 and accompanying text. 
 168. See discussion supra notes 118-36 and accompanying text. 
 169. See Dyer, supra note 122, at 545; see also Ockletree v. Franciscan Health 
Sys., 317 P.3d 1009, 1020, 1024-26 (Wash. 2014) (Stephens, J., dissenting) (rejecting 
distinction between religious and secular nonprofits in state anti-discrimination law). 
 170. See generally Dyer, supra note 122, at 554-61 (describing the secularization 
test, the sufficiently religious test, the primarily religious test, the multifactor test, and 
the nominal fee test). 
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ters, camps, and religious publishers ineligible.171  The Fourth Circuit analyz-
es whether the mission of a religiously affiliated nonprofit has become secu-
lar over time.172  Furthermore, even though some courts have read the exemp-
tion broadly to allow religious organizations to make employment decisions 
that involve sex discrimination because of the connection to church teach-
ings,173 other courts have held to the contrary.174 
Similar variations exist in the context of NLRB jurisdiction over reli-
gious colleges and universities.  Despite the D.C. Circuit’s Great Falls deci-
sion, which generally exempted religiously-affiliated nonprofit educational 
institutions,175 the NLRB continues to use the “substantially religious charac-
ter test” to distinguish between those religious institutions exempt from its 
collective bargaining requirements and those that fail the test and come with-
in its jurisdiction.  Indeed, it recently asserted jurisdiction over adjunct facul-
ty members at religious institutions who are not held out as performing a “re-
ligious function.”176 
The contested application of autonomy to religious nonprofits can also 
be seen in two specific contexts: the provision of employee benefits and the 
provision of social services to the public. 
 
 171. Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 724 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curi-
am); see also Dyer, supra note 122, at 569 (discussing exemption of religiously affili-
ated higher education from this narrow test). 
 172. Fike v. United Methodist Children’s Home of Va., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 286, 
290 (E.D. Va. 1982) (finding Methodist orphanage to be, “quite literally, Methodist 
only in name”), aff’d, 709 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1983). 
 173. See, e.g., Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(discussing premarital sex); Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991) (discussing 
canonically invalid remarriage); Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 
F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (discussing adultery). 
 174. EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding 
that conferral of benefits to men but not women based on religious beliefs constitutes 
sex discrimination); EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ’g Ass’n., 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(holding that a religious belief that men and women should be paid differently consti-
tutes sex discrimination). 
 175. See discussion supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 176. Pac. Lutheran Univ. & Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 
(2014), 2014 WL 7330993.  See also generally Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organi-
zations and Mandatory Collective Bargaining Under Federal and State Labor Laws: 
Freedom From and Freedom For, 49 VILL. L. REV. 77 (2004); Nicholas Macri, Note, 
Missing God in Some Things: The NLRB’s Jurisdictional Test Fails to Grasp the 
Religious Nature of Catholic Colleges and Universities, 55 B.C. L. REV. 609 (2014); 
Susan J. Stabile, Blame It on Catholic Bishop: The Question of NLRB Jurisdiction 
over Religious Colleges and Universities, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1317 (2013). 
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1.  Employee Benefits 
Until recently, churches and religious nonprofits were free to tailor their 
health insurance benefits to their religious teachings.177  This allowed Catho-
lic institutions, for instance, to provide insurance coverage for prescription 
drugs but not birth control.178  Within the last two decades or so, more than 
half the states began to require that employers provide employees with insur-
ance coverage for contraceptives as part of gender equity legislation.179  
While most of these states had some kind of accommodation or opt-out for 
churches and religious nonprofit employers opposed to the coverage,180 some 
state legislatures, like those of California and New York, provided an auton-
omy-based exemption only to churches and their close affiliates.181  This nar-
row religious employer exemption was based on the assumption that employ-
ees in those settings would likely share the faith and consent to the withhold-
ing of coverage; in contrast, the assumption did not apply to employees of 
those religious nonprofits that hired without regard to faith.182  This meant 
that most religious nonprofits were not eligible for the exemption and were 
required, notwithstanding a moral opposition, to include contraception in 
their insurance packages. 
In two high profile cases, the highest courts of California and New York 
held that religious nonprofits that did not qualify for the exemption had no 
constitutional right to be included within it, primarily because they had a reli-
giously diverse workforce.183  Both courts refused to extend the autonomy 
principle because employees had not consented to be governed by their em-
ployer’s faith.184  Like the California and New York statutes, the ACA’s con-
traception mandate provides the same type of narrow, autonomy-based ex-
emption for church employers and affiliates.185  Of course what differs is that 
 
 177. Caroline Mala Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 151, 151-52 (2012). 
 178. See Chad Booker, Comment, Making Contraception Easier to Swallow: 
Background and Religious Challenges to the HHS Rule Mandating Coverage of Con-
traceptives, 12 U. MD. LJ. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 169, 171-72 (2012). 
 179. Id. at 171. 
 180. See Carmella, supra note 159, at 77-80. 
 181. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(c) (West 2014); N.Y. INS. LAW 
§ 3221(h)(16)(A) (McKinney 2014). 
 182. See Camille Fischer & Jaye Kasper, Access to Contraception, 15 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 37, 42-43 (2014). 
 183. See, e.g., Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 
463 (N.Y. 2006); Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 85 P.3d 67, 
87 (Cal. 2004). 
 184. Serio, 859 N.E.2d at 465; Catholic Charities of Sacramento, 85 P.3d at 77. 
 185. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 
78 Fed. Reg. 39870-01 (July 2, 2013); see also Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. 
v. Sebelius, 987 F. Supp. 2d 232, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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although the broader class of religious nonprofits does not get the benefit of 
this exemption, it does enjoy the HHS Accommodation.186 
A similar narrowing is underway in the context of the church plan ex-
emption to the federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act 
(“ERISA”).187  Church pension plans are exempt from many of ERISA’s 
requirements, including prohibitions on benefit reductions, certain funding 
and vesting requirements, and insurance protection for pensions.188  As a re-
sult, church employees with pensions do not enjoy the same level of retire-
ment security enjoyed by employees with pensions subject to ERISA’s re-
quirements.  Although it had been common for courts to allow the church 
plan exemption to apply to nonprofits associated with churches, recent judi-
cial opinions have begun to reject this position and to narrow the church plan 
exemption to pension plans of churches.189 
2.  Beneficiaries of Social Services 
One might assume that autonomy is grounded in implied consent to be 
bound by the faith and internal organization and rules of a church.  This is 
certainly a common theme that can be identified in many cases involving the 
ministerial exception, membership, and employment.190  The jurisdictional 
nature of autonomy protection – placing the church and other religious non-
profit entities within a sphere of independent activity – seems to depend 
heavily on a notion of shared faith and mission among the members of a 
community.191  And the jurisgenerative nature of autonomy also seems to 
depend upon this voluntarism: generating and reinforcing norms within a 
community and facilitating common belief and mission for an individual and 
group involves the choice to affiliate with a community.192 
But as we have seen, autonomy protections are also extended to contexts 
outside a church community of “consenting” believers, to religious nonprofits 
 
 186. But note the numerous ongoing challenges to the HHS Accommodation by 
nonprofits.  See, e.g., Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014). 
 187. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012). 
 188. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(33), 1003, 1321 (2012). 
 189. See, e.g., Rollins v. Dignity Health, 19 F. Supp. 3d 909 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 
(nonprofit health care employer not eligible for church plan exemption); Kaplan v. 
Saint Peter’s Healthcare Sys., No. 13-2941 (MAS)(TJB), 2014 WL 1284854 (D.N.J. 
2014).  See generally Courts Increasingly Challenging Assumptions Underlying Ex-
pansion of Church Plan Exemption (Sept. 2014), Pension Plan Guide CCH, 2014 WL 
4410678. 
 190. See supra Part II.A-B. 
 191. See Mark E. Chopko & Michael F. Moses, Freedom to Be a Church: Con-
fronting Challenges to the Right of Church Autonomy, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 387, 
451-52 (2005). 
 192. Robert Joseph Renaud & Lael Daniel Weinberger, Spheres of Sovereignty: 
Church Autonomy Doctrine and the Theological Heritage of the Separation of 
Church and State, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 67, 85-86 (2008). 
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that hire outside the faith and serve the public.193  Critics focus on the unfair-
ness of exemptions that disadvantage employees and third parties – patients, 
clients, and students – who do not share the faith of the employer.194  In the 
absence of consent, critics contend that autonomy should be limited to a nar-
row purpose: to protect the identity and mission of a particular church and to 
allow it the right to define and constitute itself.  Indeed, Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent in Hobby Lobby proceeded on the assumption that the autonomy doc-
trine should apply only to hiring and serving within one’s own community.195  
Such a narrow conception of religious autonomy is unprecedented in both law 
and practice. 
Defenders of autonomy-based exemptions (at least with respect to tar-
geted issues) for religious nonprofits that hire and serve outside the faith offer 
several justifications.  For these types of entities, the purpose of autonomy is 
to foster institutional free exercise broadly and to facilitate the participation 
of morally diverse non-state actors in civil society, as well as to promote the 
Establishment Clause’s command of neutrality among different religions.196  
When the state is the only source of norms and requires all non-state actors to 
conform, then the jurisgenerative function of religious communities is sub-
verted and the jurisdictional line obliterated.197  In order to foster participa-
 
 193. This is especially the case in areas like health care and social work where 
professional standards, licensing, and accreditation set the prerequisites to entry into a 
field.  See generally William W. Bassett, Private Religious Hospitals: Limitations 
upon Autonomous Moral Choices in Reproductive Medicine, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH 
L. & POL’Y 455 (2001); Thomas C. Berg, Religious Organizational Freedom and 
Conditions on Government Benefits, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 165 (2009). 
 194. See, e.g., MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: THE PERILS OF 
EXTREME RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (2d ed. 2014); Leslie C. Griffin, Smith and Women’s 
Equality, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1831, 1842-44 (2011). 
 195. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2795 (2014) (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (“Religious organizations exist to foster the interests of persons 
subscribing to the same religious faith.”).  In Justice Ginsburg’s view “[t]he distinc-
tion between a community made up of believers in the same religion and one embrac-
ing persons of diverse beliefs . . . constantly escapes the Court’s attention.”  Id. at 
2796.  She reasoned that “[r]eligious organizations exist to serve a community of 
believers.”  Id.  She then reiterated that “[she had] already discussed the ‘special so-
licitude’ generally accorded nonprofit religion-based organizations that exist to serve 
a community of believers.”  Id. at 2802-03. 
 196. See ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: 
RECLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE 149-51(2010).  Note, however, 
that some scholars have extended the traditional “implied consent” argument to this 
context.  See, e.g., Michael A. Helfand, What Is a “Church”?: Implied Consent and 
the Contraception Mandate, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 401, 401 (2013) (contend-
ing that employee consent to rules that employers make “to achiev[e] . . . religious 
goals” should be implied “so long as [the employer is] both organized around a core 
religious mission and where that religious mission [is] open and obvious to employ-
ees.”) 
 197. See generally Carmella, supra note 72; Angela C. Carmella, Exemptions and 
the Establishment Clause, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1731 (2011). 
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tion of diverse religious groups in the civil society and support truly volun-
tary choices, there must be some acceptance of moral diversity, at least on 
specific issues. 198  The argument goes like this: for groups that serve the pub-
lic but tailor that service to their religious beliefs, the absence of specific con-
sent is mitigated when there are other nonprofits offering the same services.  
In the overall scheme of non-state providers, then, more diversity supports the 
voluntary decisions of individuals to make choices.199  This conception is 
reflected in the faith-based initiatives of the Bush and Obama administrations, 
where beneficiaries of social services are supposed to have options among 
religious and secular providers.200 
The idea of diversity among service providers has been at the core of the 
exemption claims by Catholic adoption agencies that are morally opposed to 
placing children in same-sex households.201  They have argued that same-sex 
couples have plenty of options for adopting, and that an exemption for agen-
cies with objections would not impair anyone’s ability to adopt.202  This ar-
gument failed in Massachusetts and Illinois, where exemptions were denied 
on the grounds that government has an interest in eradicating the independent 
harm of discrimination, despite the availability of other adoption agencies to 
assist same-sex couples.203  In response, several Catholic Charities agencies 
decided to terminate their involvement in adoption services altogether.204   
Harvard Law School Dean Martha Minow bemoaned the state’s failure to 
negotiate some workable solution to retain these adoption services, because 
when Catholic Charities ceased to offer adoptive services the state lost an 
organization that had over a century of expertise in the field.205 
 
 198. See Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy, Then 
and Now, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1593, 1604-09 (2004). 
 199. See VISCHER, supra note 196, at 149-51; see also Carmella, supra note 197, 
at 1733-37; Robert C. Post & Nancy L. Rosenblum, Introduction to CIVIL SOCIETY 
AND GOVERNMENT 4 (Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert C. Post eds., 2002). 
 200. Exec. Order No. 13559, 75 Fed. Reg. 71319 (Nov. 17, 2010) (amending 
Exec. Order No. 13279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77141 (Dec. 12, 2002)); Ira C. Lupu & Robert 
W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 
105-08 (2005). 
 201. See, e.g., Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City & Cnty. of 
S.F., 624 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 202. See Matthew W. Clark, Note, The Gospel According to the State: An Analy-
sis of Massachusetts Adoption Laws and the Closing of Catholic Charities Adoption 
Services, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 871, 893 (2008). 
 203. Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception, 
Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 
B.C. L. REV. 1417, 1446-47 (2012). 
 204. See id. at 1447; see also Minow, supra note 92, at 831-43. 
 205. See Minow, supra note 92, at 831-43 (describing the problems of polarized 
positions, using example of same-sex adoption).  For more information about same-
sex couples and adoption, see generally 3 Religious Organizations and the Law § 
14:28 (2013).  In Illinois, a circuit court judge decided that the state could terminate 
its relationship with Catholic Charities for refusing to assist gay adoptions.  See id.  
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In contrast, however, Virginia and North Dakota recently enacted au-
tonomy-based exemptions, which protect religious nonprofit adoption pro-
viders that object to placing children with same-sex couples.206  Under these 
laws, objecting providers retain their licenses as well as government funds 
and contracts.207 
From the foregoing, it should be clear that churches as well as many re-
ligious nonprofits enjoy broad latitude in decision-making while ministers, 
members, employees, patrons, clients and patients might have very compel-
ling stories of exclusion or harm which, in a different context, could give rise 
to various claims of discrimination, tort, or breach of contract.  Autonomy 
considerations remain closely tied to the religious freedom of religious insti-
tutions and individuals: in a system of voluntary religious exercise, with indi-
vidual rights to enter and exit churches, it is essential to preserve the freedom 
of churches to organize and perpetuate themselves.208  On occasion, this au-
tonomy is further extended to facilitate the larger project of ensuring diversity 
of non-state actors within a civil society.  Where autonomy governs, courts 
and legislatures have decided that the consequences to identifiable persons 
and groups are overshadowed by paramount considerations of individual and 
institutional freedom.  Obviously, the precise outer boundaries of the auton-
omy doctrine are highly contested, but the battles over line-drawing are being 
fought in the nonprofit context.  To extend autonomy to businesses would 
fuel doctrinal confusion and invite an unprecedented lack of accountability. 
III.  WHY BALANCING, AND NOT AUTONOMY, IS APPROPRIATE IN 
THE FOR-PROFIT CONTEXT 
Hobby Lobby should be read narrowly as a balancing case, rather than as 
an autonomy case for several reasons.  First, the Court’s decision is rooted in 
the assumption that employees will not be affected at all by the RFRA ex-
 
The court rejected the argument that the social service agency had a “legally protected 
property interest” in the renewal of its century-old contract for child services.  Id.  A 
bill with similar provisions was recently passed by the Michigan House of Represent-
atives.  See  H.R. 4991, 97th Legis. (Mich. 2014), available at http://www.legislature
.mi.gov/%28S%28jtwmkyvp0pqdcui0km2oqmbo%29%29/mileg.aspx?page=GetObje
ct&objectname=2013-HB-4991. 
 206. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 50-12-07.1 (West 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-
1709.3(A) (West 2014); see also Mark Strasser, Conscience Clauses and the Place-
ment of Children, 15 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 11-14 (2013) (discussing Virginia’s and 
North Dakota’s statutes granting autonomy-based exemptions to religiously affiliated 
adoption agencies). 
 207. See VISCHER, supra note 196, at 141-47 (discussing the need to protect di-
versity among grant and contract recipients); see also Kaveny, supra note 165 
(providing an example of autonomy protections even when government funding is 
present). 
 208. See Amos v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Latter-day Saints, 483 
U.S. 327, 342 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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emption.209  In clear contrast, autonomy-based exemptions ignore the disad-
vantages that befall persons and groups left without legal protections.  Sec-
ond, Hobby Lobby makes no suggestion that employees have consented, even 
impliedly, to be governed by the faith of the corporate owners.  In clear con-
trast, autonomy principles apply in very specific contexts of church member-
ship and mission and in the delivery of many types of services through non-
profit organizations.210  Autonomy is, at its heart, a consent-based concept; 
even where consent is attenuated or lacking – as in the case of nonprofit de-
livery of some kinds of services – the support for numerous diverse non-state 
actors in civil society is ultimately intended to promote consent by fostering 
multiple alternatives.211 
The jurisprudence of for-profit religion over the last fifty years, though 
admittedly sparse, suggests a clear demarcation between churches and reli-
gious nonprofits, on the one hand, and for-profit activities on the other.212  
Balancing has always been the prevailing approach in the for-profit con-
text.213  Courts have resisted making connections between for-profit claim-
ants and their religious communities, even where it would have been plausi-
ble to do so.214  Courts have been unwilling to pull commercial enterprises 
into the religious sphere or to link them to the jurisgenerative function of 
religious communities and have denied recognizing any jurisgenerative func-
tion of their own.215  Put bluntly, businesses are not churches. 
Now that the Court has explicitly held that for-profit entities are capable 
of exercising religion, free exercise claims from closely-held, secular busi-
nesses owned and operated by people with religious convictions will likely 
surface.  As for this class of claimants, an explicit autonomy argument is dif-
ficult to make; courts may more easily stay within the Hobby Lobby balanc-
ing framework.  But religious for-profits – a potentially large class of entities 
– could make a plausible claim for the categorical protections offered by the 
autonomy doctrine.  Religious for-profits, which provide religious goods and 
services or provide educational, health care and social services traditionally 
within the domain of nonprofits, are free-standing religious institutions rather 
than simply extensions of family businesses.  In some instances, they function 
in the same markets alongside religious nonprofits.216  These entities are 
made all the more possible by new corporate forms that facilitate combina-
tions of charitable and religious mission alongside profit-making.217  But de-
spite the changes in corporate law that blur the traditional divide between 
 
 209. See discussion supra Part I. 
 210. See discussion supra Part II. 
 211. See discussion supra Part II.D. 
 212. See discussion infra Part III.B-C. 
 213. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 214. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 215. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 216. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014). 
 217. Id. 
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nonprofits and for-profits, the religious for-profit is not capable of meeting 
the jurisdictional and jurisgenerative prerequisites for autonomy protection.  
Further, the harms to persons and groups that accompany autonomy exemp-
tions would multiply in number and intensity if an entire class of market ac-
tors, wielding economic power over access to goods, services and jobs, were 
permitted to act without regard to those they employ and serve.  And, finally, 
once the doctrine is expanded, protection will likely become diluted across 
the board.  Churches and those religious nonprofits that warrant autonomy 
protection will see the doctrine eroded even in its core application.  Courts 
must recognize that for all these reasons, the autonomy doctrine should not be 
extended to for-profits. 
A.  The Blurring of Lines Between Nonprofit and For-Profit Entities 
The autonomy jurisprudence has developed in the context of nonprofit 
institutions.  For centuries, churches and religiously affiliated educational, 
healthcare and charitable institutions have been the backbone of what is now 
called the nonprofit sector.218  Because of society’s heavy dependence on 
these institutions, their independence and protection came to be concretized 
in law.219  Indeed, traditionally there has been a comfortable fit between the 
nonprofit corporate form as an indicator of religiosity, and the for-profit form 
as an indicator of secularity.  As Justice Brennan noted in Amos: 
The fact that an operation is not organized as a profit-making com-
mercial enterprise makes colorable a claim that it is not purely secular 
in orientation. . . . [U]nlike for-profit corporations, nonprofits histori-
cally have been organized specifically to provide certain community 
services, not simply engage in commerce.  Churches often regard the 
provision of such [nonprofit] services as a means of fulfilling religious 
duty and of providing an example of the way of life a church seeks to 
foster.220 
Both Justice Brennan and Justice O’Connor, in Amos concurrences, 
gave nonprofit organizations and activities a presumptive connection to reli-
gious mission.  Justice Brennan noted that autonomy-based exemptions al-
lowing religious-based employment discrimination for nonprofits “is particu-
larly appropriate for such entities, because claims that they possess a reli-
 
 218. See generally JOHN WITTE JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 192-202 (2000). 
 219. See id. at 26 (discussing tax exemptions); see also, e.g., Georgetown Coll. v. 
Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (discussing historical development of charita-
ble immunity in tort law). 
 220. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 344 (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).  Note 
that Amos was limited to nonprofit activities.  See id. at 329-30 (majority opinion). 
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gious dimension will be especially colorable.”221  And Justice O’Connor, 
expressing the traditional skepticism toward coupling profit motive with re-
ligiosity, noted, “It is not clear . . . that activities conducted by religious or-
ganizations solely as profit-making enterprises will be as likely to be directly 
involved in the religious mission of the organization.”222  Although Justice 
Brennan was willing to speculate that a religious nonprofit could be eligible 
for autonomy-based exemptions for some type of for-profit activity that had a 
“religious character,”223 no case law had developed that concept.  In fact, a 
few years after Amos, when the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit eval-
uated a claim by a church that wanted to demolish one of its historic build-
ings to construct a forty-seven-story commercial office tower, the court de-
nied an exemption from historic preservation regulations – even though the 
revenues earned from this venture would have been used for ministry.224 
Developments in corporate law, however, have resulted in a blurring of 
lines between nonprofits and for-profits.  Many religious nonprofits are 
“commercial” nonprofits.225  For instance, religiously affiliated hospitals and 
universities provide services to the public in exchange for money; they oper-
ate within markets in which they compete with secular nonprofits and for-
profits.226  In fact, many nonprofits do earn profits; rather than distribute them 
to shareholders, they are required to reinvest them in the corporation or spend 
them to advance the corporation’s purpose.227 
 
 221. Id. at 345 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 222. Id. at 349 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 223. Id. at 345 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 224. See Rector, Wardens, and Members of Vestry of St. Bartholomew’s Church 
v. City of N.Y., 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990).  Obviously this was not an attempt to fit 
within a pre-existing autonomy-based exemption, but it is nonetheless instructive.  
See id. at 353-56.  There was no suggestion that the autonomy doctrine might apply to 
this church’s commercial activities, which would have taken the case outside the rule 
announced in Smith.  See id.  The decision was a straight application of the Smith rule 
(i.e., not granting exemptions to generally applicable, facially neutral laws).  See id.; 
see also supra note 49. 
 225. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 
840-41 (1980) (coining the term “‘commercial’ nonprofits”). 
 226. See id. at 841. 
 227. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.  This has led some courts to re-
think exemptions even for some religious nonprofits.  Take for example Judge Klein-
feld’s concurrence in Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., a case interpreting the scope of 
the Title VII exemption.  633 F.3d 741, 745-48 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (Klein-
feld, J., concurring).  He argued that any nonprofit that charged a fee should not be 
eligible.  Id.  Such commercial nonprofits are like for-profits in that both make mon-
ey; thus, neither should be considered a religious corporation for purposes of the ex-
emption.  Id.  He wrote: 
Nonprofit status affects corporate governance, not eleemosynary activities. . . .  
“For-profit” and “nonprofit” have nothing to do with making money. . . .  For 
example, physicians may organize a hospital as a non-profit affiliated with a 
church, stating a religious purpose of healing the sick in its articles and by-
laws.  The hospital may then charge full market prices to patients and their in-
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Even more significant are changes within the for-profit sector.  The 
movement for corporate social responsibility (initiated largely by religious 
activists in the 1970s) has succeeded in getting many entities to embrace 
communitarian values in addition to, and even at the expense of, profit-
making.228  Many corporations have become leaders in advocating for a di-
verse workforce, paying just wages and benefits beyond legal minimums, and 
supporting social and charitable causes.229  And while charitable works are 
still usually pursued through the nonprofit corporate form, a for-profit corpo-
ration is free to have a mission traditionally associated with non-profits.  
Google’s establishment of the first “for-profit charity” provides a clear illus-
tration of how for-profit and nonprofit categories have become increasingly 
interconnected.230 
The Court mentioned these trends in Hobby Lobby.  Responding to the 
statements of some federal courts that said for-profit corporations could not 
exercise religion because they were solely concerned with making money, 
Justice Alito wrote: 
 
surers, and pay [market rate salaries to employees].  It can defend its stated re-
ligious purpose with the true argument that whatever church it affiliates with 
promotes healing of the sick as a religious duty.  Yet the nonprofit hospital 
differs from a for-profit hospital only in that the board does not have to con-
cern itself with pesky stockholders and does not have to pay income taxes on 
the excess of revenues over expenses and depreciation.  The free exercise con-
cern protected by the exemption does not suggest that the hospital should be 
allowed to discriminate by religion in hiring, since physicians, nurses, and 
other employees can perform their tasks equally well regardless of their reli-
gious beliefs. 
Id. at 46.  Judge Kleinfeld was responding to Judge O’Scannlain’s separate concur-
rence.  See id. at 741-48.  Judge O’Scannlain had argued that a nonprofit corporate 
form indicated the religious nature of an organization.  See id. at 741-42. 
 228. See, e.g., Julie Marie Baworowsky, Note, From Public Square to Market 
Square: Theoretical Foundations of First and Fourteenth Amendment Protection of 
Corporate Religious Speech, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1713, 1714 n.4 (2008) (citing 
other sources for notion that “welcoming religious discourse within the corporation 
can encourage corporations to act ‘beyond’ their own self-interest” and give consider-
ation to stakeholders beyond shareholders); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithful-
ness in Corporate Theory, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2006) (describing social respon-
sibilities and fiduciary obligations owed to non-shareholder groups, such as employ-
ees, creditors, suppliers, neighbors, localities); Susan J. Stabile, A Catholic Vision of 
the Corporation, 4 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 181, 198 (2005) (describing “non-legal 
approaches to promoting corporate behavior consistent with the common good”). 
 229. See infra Part IV.B-C. 
 230. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 n.27 (2014); 
Katie Hafner, Philanthropy Google’s Way: Not the Usual, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/14/technology/14google.html?pagewanted
=all&_r=0 (explaining that Google.org is a for-profit charity that pays taxes and start-
ed with “seed money of about $1 billion and a mandate to tackle poverty, disease and 
global warming”); see also, Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit 
Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017 (2007). 
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[M]odern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to 
pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not do so.  
For-profit corporations, with ownership approval, support a wide vari-
ety of charitable causes, and it is not at all uncommon for such corpo-
rations to further humanitarian and other altruistic objectives. . . .  In 
fact, recognizing the inherent compatibility between establishing a for-
profit corporation and pursuing nonprofit goals, States have increas-
ingly adopted laws formally recognizing hybrid corporate forms.  
Over half of the States, for instance, now recognize the “benefit corpo-
ration,” a dual-purpose entity that seeks to achieve both a benefit for 
the public and a profit for its owners.231 
From this, Justice Alito extrapolated a principle: if for-profits can pursue 
nonprofit goals, “there is no apparent reason why they may not further reli-
gious objectives as well.”232   And indeed, long before the concept of the ben-
efit corporation was introduced, some for-profit corporations have embraced 
an explicitly religious message.233  Hobby Lobby’s corporate documents 
 
 231. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771. 
 232. Id.; see also Baworowsky, supra note 228, at 1746 (“Religion and profit-
making coexist in a rich pluralistic framework of groups mediating between individu-
als, the state, and other groups.  The corporation is a flexible entity determined by 
individual choices through law; its individual creators have the choice whether a cor-
poration shall be single purpose (profit-making) or would do better to have many 
purposes (profit-making, social responsibility, and religious identity).  Absence of 
corporate religious identity can only come from individual choices to incorporate for 
other purpose[s], state-created limits on permissible corporate purposes, or both.”). 
 233. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 14; see also, e.g., Kim Bhasin & Melanie 
Hicken, 17 Big Companies That Are Intensely Religious, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 19, 2012, 
11:29 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/17-big-companies-that-are-intensely-
religious-2012-1?op=1 (listing the following examples: Forever 21; Tyson Foods 
(core value of honoring God, employing chaplains to give pastoral care to employ-
ees); Chick-fil-A (closed on Sundays); Mary Kay; In-N-Out Burger (Bible passages 
on cups, wrappers); Timberland (CEO attributing motivation to Jewish faith); Alaska 
Air (gives inspirational note cards with passages from Old Testament to customers); 
Marriott Hotels (unavailability of pay-per-view pornography in rooms, known some-
times to place Book of Mormon alongside Bible in rooms); JetBlue (Mormon, family-
friendly policies for employees); Interstate Batteries (corporate mission statement “to 
glorify God”); Trijicon (weapons maker known to inscribe coded Biblical references 
on rifle sights used by the military); Hobby Lobby; ServiceMaster (Merry Maids, 
Terminix, American Home Shield) (company commitment to “honor God”); George 
Foreman Cooking (refusing to invest in sellers who promote alcohol); H.E.B. (gro-
cery chain closed on Sundays); Curves (founder is born-again Christian); and Tom’s 
of Maine (founder graduated from Harvard Divinity School, wrote book with subtitle 
“Managing for Profit and the Common Good”)); Michelle Conlin, Religion in the 
Workplace: The Growing Presence of Spirituality in Corporate America, 
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 1, 1999), http://www.businessweek.com/1999/99_44/b365300
1.htm (noting, among other trends, the hiring of chaplains for employees and the 
development of research centers dedicated to spirituality in the workplace at the Uni-
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commit it to operate in accordance with “Biblical Principles,” which means 
that all 500 of its arts and crafts stores are closed on Sundays, at great finan-
cial cost to its owners; it does not engage in transactions that promote alco-
hol; it proselytizes through newspaper ads; and it contributes generously to 
Christian ministries.234  As Professor Lyman Johnson noted, “[F]aith and 
spiritual values have influenced” even large companies, with a “leavening 
effect that a focus on non-economic values can have in a corporate cul-
ture.”235  And like nonprofits, for-profits with goals beyond profit can func-
tion as mediating institutions between the individual and the state in civil 
society.236 
B.  The Use of Balancing in For-Profit Religion Jurisprudence 
Given the blurring of lines between the nonprofit and for-profit sectors, 
partnered with the Court’s explicit holding that religious exercise is possible 
in the for-profit corporate context, the question turns to whether the autono-
my approach available to religious nonprofits might also be available to for-
profits.  The relevant case law has remained and should remain squarely with-
in the balancing paradigm. 
Over the last fifty years, religious freedom claims made in connection 
with for-profit activities have fallen into two categories.  The first involved 
individuals or entities claiming an exemption from a regulation that made it 
more expensive to practice their religion.237  Because exemptions to remedy 
economic burdens often result in a competitive advantage for religious claim-
ants over secular businesses in the same market,238 these claims were general-
 
versity of Denver and the University of New Haven); Johnson, supra note 228, at 16 
(listing UPS, Timberland, Starbucks, Southwest Airlines, and Herman Miller as being 
influenced by faith and spiritual values); supra note 51 (listing companies involved in 
challenges to the contraception mandate). 
 234. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2766. 
 235. Johnson, supra note 228, at 16-17.  Given the “wide latitude” of managerial 
discretion, managers can look to religious traditions to inform their decisions and to 
enflesh a duty of faithfulness, which “‘overarch[es]’ the traditional fiduciary duties of 
care and loyalty.”  Id. at 5, 10; see also VISCHER, supra note 196, at 179-86 (noting 
that corporations are “venues for conscience”). 
 236. See, e.g., VISCHER, supra note 196, at 147; Baworowsky, supra note 228, at 
1740-41. 
 237. See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 
378, 382 (1990); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 293-
94 (1985); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 601 (1961). 
 238. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 608-09; see also Thomas C. Berg, Religious 
Structures Under the Federal Constitution, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF IDENTITY, LIBERTY, AND THE LAW 129, 164 (Serritella et 
al. eds. 2006).  This was certainly a concern for the Amos court, as voiced by Justice 
Brennan: religious nonprofits engaged in for-profit activities that could discriminate 
in hiring would have “the added advantages of economic leverage in the secular 
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ly unsuccessful.  The second category involved individuals or entities with 
conscience claims, as in Hobby Lobby, objecting to a law that forces partici-
pation in an activity the individual or entity considers sinful or immoral. 
Those conscience claims came in a variety of areas, and the results have 
been mixed.  In the 1990s, some landlords refused to rent apartments to co-
habiting couples (which they were required to do under state anti-
discrimination laws).239  More recently, several pharmacists have refused to 
stock and sell emergency contraception;240 several businesses have refused to 
provide goods or services for same-sex weddings;241 and some taxi drivers 
 
realm.”  Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 343 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 239. Holding against landlord: See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Emp’t and Hous. Comm’n, 
913 P.2d 909, 924 (Cal. 1996) (holding that prohibition against discrimination on 
basis of marital status was generally applicable and neutral toward religion and, thus, 
did not violate federal free exercise of religion clause and did not “substantially bur-
den” landlord’s religious exercise within meaning of RFRA); Swanner v. Anchorage 
Equal Rights Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274, 283 (Alaska 1994) (holding that prohibition 
against discriminating on the basis of marital status does not infringe landlord’s reli-
gious freedom because “[v]oluntary commercial activity does not receive the same 
status accorded to directly religious activity”); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 
233, 237-43 (Mass. 1994) (holding that statutory mandate that landlords could not 
discriminate against unmarried couples in renting accommodations substantially bur-
dened landlords’ sincerely held religious belief against cohabitation, but reversing and 
remanding grant of summary judgment because there remained fact questions as to 
whether Commonwealth had compelling interest in eliminating discrimination in 
housing based on marital status and whether any such interest was sufficiently com-
pelling). 
  Holding in favor of landlord: See, e.g., Donahue v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. 
Comm’n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that landlords’ refusal 
to rent violated statute prohibiting “marital status” discrimination but landlords were 
entitled to exemption from statute because state’s interest in protecting unmarried 
cohabiting couples from discrimination did not outweigh landlords’ legitimate asser-
tion of their right to free exercise of religion under state constitution), superseded by 
825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992); State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 11 (Minn. 1990) 
(holding that landlord’s conscience rights under state constitution allowed him to 
refuse to rent to cohabiting couple). 
 240. See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1175, 1194-95 (W.D. 
Wash. 2012) (finding a law requiring pharmacies to stock and dispense such drugs 
(without any conscience exemption) to be specifically targeted at religious and moral 
objectors and noting concern with the selective enforcement in that the state enforced 
it against several small pharmacies but had no plans to enforce it against Catholic 
hospital pharmacies); Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevich, 901 N.E.2d 373, 377-78 (Ill. 
2008) (allowing owners of pharmacies to proceed with a claim that their conscien-
tious objections to stock and dispense such drugs were protected by the Free Exercise 
Clause). 
 241. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59-60 (N.M. 2013) 
(ordering business that refused to photograph same-sex commitment ceremony to pay 
money to couple that was turned away); cf. State by McClure v. Sports & Health 
Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 845-47 (Minn. 1985) (discussing health club owners’ 
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have refused to transport passengers carrying alcohol.242  And, perhaps most 
notably, the owners of the corporations in Hobby Lobby refused to direct their 
companies to pay for contraceptive coverage within the employee insurance 
package.243  Such claims for exemptions do not give rise to the same “com-
petitive advantage” noted above in the economic burden claims; indeed, re-
fusals to provide a product or serve a customer tend to generate negative pub-
licity against the objecting business.  This became especially evident recently 
in Arizona and Indiana where business leaders vociferously opposed state 
legislation intended to protect the conscience claims of small businesses.244 
Some of these courts assessing conscience claims, as part of the balanc-
ing approach, considered not only an exemption’s discriminatory impacts in 
the provision of commercial goods and services, but also possible mitigation 
of those impacts.  The impacts on customers deprived of emergency contra-
ception were mitigated by the practice of referring the customer to another 
pharmacy (as is commonly done when a drug is not in stock).245  And of 
 
refusal to hire potential employees who did not follow strict behavioral code); Grant 
Rodgers, Grimes’ Gortz Haus to Stop All Weddings in Wake of Discrimination Com-
plaint, DES MOINES REGISTER (Jan. 28, 2015, 6:49 PM), http://www.desmoinesreg-
ister.com/story/news/investigations/2015/01/28/gortz-haus-owners-decide-stop-we-
ddings/22492677 (discussing Mennonite owners of historic hall that serves as a loca-
tion for private events denying gay couple the use of facilities suing the Iowa Civil 
Rights Commission to prevent them from being forced to host wedding in violation of 
their beliefs). 
 242. Muslim Cab Drivers Lose Round in Court, MPRNEWS (Sept. 9, 2008), 
http://www.mprnews.org/story/2008/09/09/muslim_cabs_court. 
 243. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2766 (2014). 
 244. See David Brodwin, Businesses Bring Arizona Back from the Brink on Gays, 
U.S. NEWS (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/
2014/02/28/why-businesses-opposed-the-arizona-anti-gay-bill; Fernanda Santos, 
Arizona Governor Vetoes Bill on Refusal of Service to Gays, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/27/us/Brewer-arizona-gay-service-bill.html
?_r=1.  Arizona’s governor vetoed RFRA-like legislation that, in its application, could 
have given businesses the right to refuse to supply goods and services to same-sex 
weddings on religious grounds.  See Santos, supra.  Business leaders strenuously 
opposed the law, predicting it would cause “financial disaster for the state.”  Id.  Josh 
Hicks & Sarah Halzack, Gov. Pence Defends Religious Freedom Bill Amid Continued 
Criticism, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/gov-pence-
defends-religious-freedom-bill-amid-continued-criticism/2015/03/29/c8174cbe-d63a-
11e4-ba28-f2a685dc7f89_story.html (describing criticism that allowing businesses to 
refuse goods and services to same-sex weddings would harm Indiana’s economy). 
 245. See Stormans, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1190.  The availability of housing alterna-
tives was not a factor in the landlord decisions.  See, e.g., Swanner v. Anchorage 
Equal Rights Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274, 282 (Alaska 1994).  Indeed, the Swanner court 
noted: 
One could argue that if a prospective tenant finds alternative housing after be-
ing initially denied because of a landlord’s religious beliefs, the government’s 
derivative interest is satisfied.  However, the government also possesses a 
transactional interest in preventing acts of discrimination based on irrelevant 
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course the Hobby Lobby Court assumed a total mitigation of impacts by an 
expanded HHS Accommodation.246 
C.  The Divide Between For-Profit Activity and Church 
Both the jurisdictional and jurisgenerative prerequisites for institutional 
autonomy claims have been missing in the for-profit religion jurisprudence.  
The Supreme Court has repeatedly resisted re-making businesses into church-
es or church-affiliated entities, even where it might have been plausible to do 
so, and has neither recognized the links between businesses and churches nor 
protected church-like internal operations of businesses.247  The Court has 
been careful not to align businesses with churches in the autonomy discourse 
and has been careful not to suggest that a business is central to creating or 
reinforcing norms for a community of believers.248  Hobby Lobby continues 
this restraint.  In Hobby Lobby, the corporations were secular, commercial 
entities owned and operated by families with religious scruples, and the anal-
ysis centered on protecting the owners’ religious exercise.  True, the Court 
protected the corporate exercise of religion by finding an identity with the 
owners’ faith;249 but there was no discussion of a symbiotic relationship be-
tween the corporation and a church, nor was there talk of a church community 
created within the corporation. 
Hobby Lobby is thus consistent with the Court’s historic treatment of 
for-profit free exercise claims.  In the 1961 case Braunfeld v. Brown, Ortho-
dox Jewish business owners in Philadelphia sought an exemption from Sun-
day closing laws because their businesses were closed on Saturdays.250  Clos-
ing on both weekend days meant serious financial loss and economic disad-
vantage.251  The Court held that “the Sunday [closing] law simply regulates a 
secular activity and, as applied to appellants, operates so as to make the prac-
tice of their religious beliefs more expensive.”252  This “imposes only an indi-
rect burden on the exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does not make 
unlawful the religious practice itself . . . .”253  The Court noted a further justi-
 
characteristics regardless of whether the prospective tenants ultimately find al-
ternative housing. 
Id. 
 246. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. 
 247. See infra notes 255-82 and accompanying text. 
 248. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2773-74. 
 249. See id. at 2774-75. 
 250. 366 U.S. 599, 601 (1961).  Another challenge to Sunday closing laws was 
decided on the same day; Braunfeld controlled in that case, and a majority of the 
Court assumed, without deciding, that a for-profit business could challenge the Sun-
day closing law.  See Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Supermarket of Mass., Inc., 366 
U.S. 617 (1961). 
 251. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 601. 
 252. Id. at 605. 
 253. Id. at 606. 
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fication: an exemption allowing these business owners to open on Sundays 
would give them an “economic advantage over their competitors” – those 
businesses that are required to close on Sundays.254  Thus, in an implicit bal-
ancing, the Court considered the exemption’s harm to third parties – those 
businesses that were required to close on Sundays. 
While Braunfeld is usually considered a simple case of economic bur-
den, there is more to it.  The holding suggests the irrelevance of any autono-
my considerations.255  No regard was shown for the local Orthodox Jewish 
community the businesses likely served – those customers who are now de-
prived of the ability to shop on Sundays.  Had there been an Orthodox non-
profit whose activities were similarly curtailed on Sundays, it would have 
been easier to argue that its schedule should comport to the community it 
serves.  But the Court never mentioned this.  It was concerned only that Jew-
ish businesses open on Sundays could take business away from merchants 
whose stores were closed.256  In the for-profit context, the business is not 
understood to function like a worshipping community or like a religious non-
profit.  Instead, the rules of commerce govern.257 
Two decades later, the Court considered several for-profit cases in 
which the employer and employees shared the same faith.  A common faith 
could have justified an autonomy-based exemption on the grounds that it 
would have promoted the freedom of a religious community’s identity and 
mission.  But the Court used a balancing analysis instead, and declined to 
carve out exemptions, in part because of the strong desire to protect employ-
ees from the potential harmful impacts of such an exemption: employer coer-
cion of faith and economic exploitation.  The commercial context, with its 
commitment to a diverse workforce, prevented the Court from viewing the 
workplace in communal religious terms. 
In the first decision, United States v. Lee, an Amish farmer/carpenter 
employer sued for a refund of taxes, arguing that paying social security taxes 
violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause as well as those of his em-
ployees, all of whom were Amish.258  The Amish refuse government assis-
tance in caring for the elderly in their communities and therefore oppose pay-
ing into the social security fund.259  The Court found that while coerced par-
ticipation in the social security system created a burden on Amish beliefs, that 
burden was justified because “mandatory and continuous participation in and 
contribution to the social security system” is “essential to accomplish[ing] an 
overriding governmental interest.”260  The Court analogized social security 
 
 254. Id. at 608. 
 255. See id. at 608-09. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See infra Part IV.B (discussing businesses that supply religious goods and 
services to specific religious communities). 
 258. 455 U.S. 252, 254-56 (1982). 
 259. Id. at 255. 
 260. Id. at 257-59. 
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payments to more general taxation, noting that “religious belief in conflict 
with the payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax.”261  Congress 
had already granted a narrow exemption to self-employed Amish, but to ex-
tend the exemption to everyone employed by an Amish employer could un-
dermine the larger tax system.262  Thus, the Court implied that the narrow 
exemption fulfilled the requirement that the government advance its interest 
in the least restrictive manner. 
The Court took the unusual step of noting the coercive nature of an em-
ployer exemption: 
[E]very person cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to ex-
ercising every aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs.  When 
followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter 
of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of 
conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory 
schemes which are binding on others in that activity.  Granting an ex-
emption from social security taxes to an employer operates to impose 
the employer’s religious faith on the employees.263 
This concern about an employer imposing his or her faith on the em-
ployees was unusual because all of the employees in this case were Amish.264  
Since Edwin Lee had brought the case not only for himself but also on behalf 
of his employees, it appeared that this was not an element of the case before 
the Court.  Indeed, it is clear that the identification of the burden implicated 
the Amish community generally.  It was not only a burden on the employer’s 
faith, but also a burden on “the Amish faith,” Mr. Lee’s faith, and the faith of 
his employees.265  Although the Court refused to grant the exemption under 
the weight of the government’s interest, it was acutely aware of communal 
meaning of the religious claim – that an exemption would protect the identity 
and faith of the religious community.266  In earlier case law the Court had 
been emphatic that the Amish faith pervaded every aspect of their lives,267 so, 
in this case, it would have been easy for the Court to acknowledge that a law 
 
 261. Id. at 260.  The court reasoned that “[t]he tax system could not function if 
denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were 
spent in a manner that violates their religious beliefs.”  Id. 
 262. Id. at 260-61. 
 263. Id. at 261. 
 264. See id. at 254. 
 265. See id. at 257.  Because the Amish oppose both payment and receipt of social 
security benefits, the Court noted that requiring payment does not coerce the ac-
ceptance of benefits.  Id. at 261 n.12.  Though the Court conceded that “[i]t is not for 
us to speculate whether this would ease or mitigate the perceived sin of participation,” 
it noted nevertheless that “it would be possible for an Amish member . . . to accept 
social security and pass along to an Amish fund having parallel objectives.”  Id. 
 266. See id. at 261. 
 267. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210 (1972). 
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regulating the workplace could threaten the religious community.  But it did 
not, choosing instead to describe the employer and employee in adversarial 
terms.268 
Potential autonomy considerations also present themselves in Tony and 
Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor.269  The Alamo Foundation 
was a Christian nonprofit that served as a rescue mission and religious com-
munity to the poor and sick.270  The Foundation operated nearly forty com-
mercial businesses to train its “associates” – converted criminals and addicts 
who did not consider themselves “employees.”271  The Foundation did not 
pay the associates wages, but it did provide food, clothing and shelter.272  The 
Labor Department characterized the relationship differently, arguing that 
these businesses were subject to wage and other terms of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (“FLSA”) and that the associates were employees entitled to 
the statute’s protections.273  The Foundation sued, challenging the applicabil-
ity of the FLSA as a violation of the associates’ free exercise and its own 
right to be free from government entanglement.274  The Court found that the 
FLSA did apply and that Labor Department regulations explicitly provided 
that commercial activities of religious nonprofits were subject to its terms in 
order to avoid any competitive advantage.275  The Court found that applying 
the FLSA to the Foundation caused no excessive entanglement in church 
affairs; it further found that free exercise rights of the associates were not 
burdened.276  The associates claimed quite vehemently that they did not want 
to be paid wages.277  Their claim, on its face, was about their connection to 
the religious community and the religious freedom of the community.278  But 
the Court found that because the associates were already receiving in-kind 
benefits, and because the wage requirement could be met by in-kind pay-
 
 268. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 261. 
 269. 471 U.S. 290, 303 (1985). 
 270. Id. at 292. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. at 273. 
 274. Id. at 303. 
 275. Id. at 299 (“[T]he payment of substandard wages . . . is exactly this kind of 
‘unfair method of competition’ that the Act was intended to prevent, and the admix-
ture of religious motivations does not alter a business’s effect on commerce.” (inter-
nal citations omitted)).  The Labor Department’s regulation stated: “Activities of 
eleemosynary, religious, or educational organization[s] may be performed for a busi-
ness purpose” and therefore treats those “ordinary commercial activities” the same as 
“when they are performed by the ordinary business enterprise.”  Id. at 297 (citing 29 
C.F.R. § 779.214).  The Court even noted the “broad congressional consensus that 
ordinary commercial businesses should not be exempted from the Act simply because 
they happened to be owned by religious or other nonprofit organizations.”  Id. at 298. 
 276. Id. at 303. 
 277. Id. at 293. 
 278. See id. at 303. 
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ments, no actual burden resulted from inclusion in the FLSA statutory pro-
gram.279 
Like the Amish employer and employees in Lee, the Alamo Foundation 
and its associates, though tied in a commercial relationship, were fundamen-
tally connected to each other as a religious community.  Both cases involved 
religious identity and mission.  But the Court in both cases was concerned 
about harm to identifiable persons.  In Lee, even though the employer and 
employees shared the same faith, the Court was concerned that an exemption 
would have the effect of allowing an employer to impose its faith on the em-
ployees.280  And in Alamo, even though the associates claimed that they were 
volunteers doing work as part of their ministry, with no expectation of com-
pensation, the Court was concerned that exemptions opened the door to ex-
ploitation or coercion by employers – in fact, there was some suggestion in 
the record that associates had suffered injustices in hours worked and pun-
ishments for poor work.281  The Court in both cases refused to treat the work-
place as a church, even in the face of what looked like shared faith among 
employees.282 
This resistance to analogizing a business to a church is reflected in low-
er federal court decisions as well.  A year after the 1987 Amos decision, a for-
profit corporation argued that it should enjoy the benefit of the Title VII ex-
emption.  In Townley v. EEOC, a manufacturing company defended a reli-
gious discrimination claim brought by a former employee by arguing that it 
was a “religious corporation” capable of making religion-based employment 
decisions.283  The Townleys, owners of this closely held corporation, were 
religious and held weekly devotional services that employees were required 
to attend.284  The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that the business was a 
religious corporation, noting that the company was for-profit and not church 
affiliated, produced a secular product, and had no religious purpose in its 
corporate documents.285  The fact that the Townleys were religious (and en-
gaged in many religious acts through the company) was not enough to make 
the corporation “religious” within the meaning of the statute (or under the 
Constitution for that matter).286  While the Townleys were not required to 
abandon the devotional services, they were required by law to accommodate 
 
 279. Id. at 303-04.  The Foundation had argued a burden due to government en-
tanglement in their internal affairs, which was essentially an autonomy claim; the 
associates argued that if they were required to receive wages it would burden their 
free exercise.  Id. at 303.  The former claim was rejected; on the latter claim, the 
Court said that since associates were already being paid in-kind, no actual change 
occurred and no burden resulted.  Id. at 303-04. 
 280. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982). 
 281. See Alamo, 471 U.S. at 301 n.22, 302. 
 282. See id. at 306; Lee, 455 U.S. at 261. 
 283. 859 F.2d 610, 617 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 284. Id. at 612. 
 285. Id. at 619. 
 286. Id. 
49
Carmella: Carmella: After Hobby Lobby
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
430 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
employees who did not want to attend.287  Protecting the rights of the owners 
would have negative impacts on identifiable persons: their employees. 
The Townleys had tried to create a religious community at their work-
place.  They thought of the exemption claim for their corporation in autono-
my terms: just like a church can control its membership, they wanted to con-
trol the company’s pool of employees using religious criteria.288  Each em-
ployee had to sign a statement agreeing to attend the devotional services and 
recognizing that they could be fired for failing to do so.289  The Townleys 
argued that with these signatures, employees waived their rights to seek ac-
commodations for their own religious needs; further, the Townleys argued 
that the corporation was “founded to ‘share with all of its employees the spir-
itual aspects of the company.’”290  But the court held that the Townleys had to 
protect the religious rights of employees who objected to participation.291  In 
rejecting the statutory and constitutional claims, the court made clear that in 
the for-profit context, employers could not create a church.292  In essence, the 
court said – like the Supreme Court implied in Lee and Alamo – that the de-
fendants, running a secular business, did not deserve the kind of autonomy 
enjoyed by a church. 
Neither the Court nor the plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby suggested that the 
corporate plaintiffs or their owners were trying to create a church in the 
workplace.  The owners incorporated to establish a business that would bal-
ance profit seeking and religious mission according to their own beliefs.293  
Their conscientious objection to providing contraceptive coverage to employ-
ees was not framed as a shared belief among employees.294  The Court was 
quite clear that the thousands of employees of the objecting companies that 
are eligible for the coverage should and will receive it.295  In keeping with 
Braunfeld, Lee and Alamo (and consistent with Townley), the Court resisted 
any notion that the owners are doing anything other than demanding their 
 
 287. Id. at 621; see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 76-
77 (1977) (holding that employer had duty to accommodate employee’s religion un-
less accommodation placed “undue hardship” on employer); Young v. Sw. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n, 509 F.2d 140, 144-45 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that employer requiring 
employee to attend monthly staff meetings that opened with a religious exercise was 
religious discrimination and employer had duty to accommodate). 
 288. Townley, 859 F.2d at 612-13. 
 289. See id. at 612. 
 290. Id. at 616. 
 291. Id. at 621. 
 292. See id. at 618-19. 
 293. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2765-66 (2014). 
 294. See id. at 2764-66.  It might have done this with respect to Conestoga Wood 
Specialties, where the Mennonite owners shared the faith of their 950 Mennonite 
employees.  See id. at 2764-65.  It did not.  See id. 
 295. Id. at 2780-83. 
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own religious freedom in seeking to run their corporations in accordance with 
their faith.296 
IV.  THE TEMPTATION TO EXTEND AUTONOMY TO THE “RELIGIOUS 
FOR-PROFIT” AND WHY COURTS SHOULD NOT GIVE IN 
Nearly all the businesses challenging the contraception mandate were 
closely-held corporations operated in accordance with religious beliefs but 
engaged in nonreligious endeavors like manufacturing and retail.297  These 
“secular” for-profits stand in contrast to the category of “religious” for-
profits, which are defined in this Article as corporations that provide explicit-
ly religious goods and services or that engage in work traditionally undertak-
en by nonprofits.  Indeed, two of the businesses challenging the mandate – a 
religious publishing house and a religious bookseller – are religious for-
profits under this definition.298 
It is impossible to know how Hobby Lobby will be applied to the free 
exercise claims of secular for-profits – whether narrowly, under a balancing 
paradigm, or broadly, under an autonomy paradigm.  Obviously from the 
remarks thus far, this Article would argue that free exercise claims of secular 
for-profits should be constrained within a balancing framework.  But the ul-
timate contention of this Article is that balancing should apply even to those 
free exercise claims of for-profit entities that appear to make a plausible 
claim for autonomy: the religious for-profit.  Religious for-profits differ sub-
stantially from secular businesses like arts and crafts stores or cabinet manu-
facturers owned and directed by religious people.  Religious for-profits need 
not be conceptualized as an extension of their owners’ faith but can be 
 
 296. See id. at 2768-75.  In fact, the idea that the focus is on the individual own-
ers’ faith helps us to understand and properly restrict Justice Alito’s invocation of the 
similarities between for-profits and religious nonprofits.  He wrote, 
The dissent suggests that nonprofit corporations are special because furthering 
their religious “autonomy . . . often furthers individual religious freedom as 
well.”  But this principle applies equally to for-profit corporations: Furthering 
their religious freedom also “furthers individual religious freedom.”  In these 
cases, for example, allowing Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel to assert 
RFRA claims protects the religious liberty of the Greens and the Hahns [the 
families that own them]. 
Id. at 2769 (quoting Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring)).  With this 
language, Justice Alito is noting only that protecting both types of corporations, for-
profit and nonprofit, will advance individual freedom.  He is not suggesting that for-
profits should be pulled within autonomy protections. 
 297. See supra note 51.  But see Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765 (one of the three 
corporate plaintiffs, Mardel – unlike Hobby Lobby or Conestoga – is engaged in a 
religious endeavor: sales of Christian literature). 
 298. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765 (discussing Mardel, the religious 
bookseller); Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 111 
(D.D.C. 2012) (discussing Tyndale, the religious publishing house). 
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viewed independently as entities possessing faith and mission, as entities with 
a religious character.299   A religious for-profit might even have an unmistak-
able connection to a church or identifiable religious community or tradi-
tion.300  But even if it does not, it can still function to support or enliven a 
distinct religious community or tradition.  Indeed, these entities would not 
exist but for a religious community or tradition.  And because they are enti-
ties that endure past the lifespans of any individual, they can be established 
and organized in a way that ensures continuity of their religious identity, pur-
pose and function.301 
Because of these characteristics, a court might be tempted to consider 
religious for-profits to be institutions that warrant autonomy protection.  But 
the decision to do so would be dangerous.  Autonomy gives religious entities 
protections that are categorical in nature, as a matter of constitutional design, 
and the negative consequences on identifiable individuals and groups are not 
taken into account.  For-profits wield too much economic power and too 
many people would be made vulnerable to the harmful impacts of exemp-
tions.  It would be a mistake to add an entirely new class of entities to the 
class of religious institutions that currently enjoy autonomy protection.  It is 
especially unwise to expand the circle of autonomy protection to include for-
profits at a time (like now) when courts and legislatures are struggling to de-
termine whether and when to grant autonomy protections to religious non-
profits that hire and serve beyond their faith communities and/or that wield 
economic power in ways similar to for-profit entities.302  Are we really ready 
for business entities to claim protection under the ministerial exception for 
decisions regarding “positions of substantial religious importance”303 or un-
der the Title VII exemption, NLRB exemption, or other autonomy-based 
exemptions? 
 
 299. See infra Part IV.B-C; see also Amos, 483 U.S. at 345 n.6 (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (“It is also conceivable that some for-profit activities could have a religious 
character . . . .”); Johnson, supra note 228, at 3 (“A business corporation . . . is not, 
and need not be, inherently secular in nature.”). 
 300. See infra Part IV.B-C. 
 301. See generally Baworowsky, supra note 228.  But cf. Usha Rodrigues, Entity 
and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1283-84 (2011) (“Nonprofits can create and ‘sell’ a 
particular kind of identity, one in which an individual may participate as employee, 
donor, or volunteer.  This identity is the organization’s chief defense against agency 
costs: If managers stray too far from the entity’s nonprofit ethos, they will not merely 
suffer a loss of reputation, or risk sanctions for norm violation, or subject themselves 
and the entity to a reputational loss; they will injure – perhaps severely – the value of 
the enterprise itself. . . .  What sets nonprofits apart as organizations is their ability to 
create a distinctive kind of identity. . . .  While for-profit companies may adopt ‘feel 
good’ marketing, branding, or positional strategies, it is understood that those goals 
are subsidiary to the profit imperative.  The core mission of the nonprofit, in contrast, 
is to maximize the output of some social good.”). 
 302. See discussion supra Part II.D. 
 303. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 
694, 712 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
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At first glance, the obstacles to viewing the claimants in Braunfeld, Lee, 
Alamo and Hobby Lobby as connected to and generating norms for a religious 
community do not seem to exist when we look at religious for-profits.  Reli-
gious for-profits, unlike secular for-profits, are by their own definition con-
nected to larger religious communities and traditions.  Surely they create – or 
at least reinforce – norms and “are organized around a religious mission with 
a guiding doctrine and goal to facilitate individual and collective religious 
belief.”304  Does this render them jurisgenerative institutions that fall within 
the “church” jurisdiction on the church-state divide?  In other words, are they 
similar enough to churches and religious nonprofits that they should receive 
protection under an autonomy approach?  In this Article’s view, the answer is 
no.  Countervailing considerations, which will be described below, like the 
distribution of profits to owners, the role of for-profits in the economy, and 
the potential widespread impacts resulting from categorical protections, argue 
against the extension. 
The discussion below focuses on the kinds of businesses that might 
press autonomy claims.  As a preliminary matter, this Article entertains and 
rejects the possibility of a “for-profit church.”  After that, it considers two 
categories of entities most eligible for a “religious for-profit” designation.  
The first is comprised of for-profits engaged in traditional commerce: exclu-
sively providing religious goods and services.  The second category is com-
prised of for-profits with traditional missions: education, social services, and 
health care.  Even with autonomy protections for nonprofits in certain cir-
cumstances, and even in the face of obvious analogies in the case of mission-
driven for-profits, countervailing considerations must constrain the extension 
of autonomy. 
A.  For-Profit Churches? 
It is well established that churches – core faith communities that gather 
for worship and that pass beliefs on from generation to generation – enjoy 
immunity from lawsuits under the ministerial exception and other autonomy-
based protections of their employment and membership decisions.  Could a 
church, as we know it, be organized as a for-profit entity?  One could imagine 
a person or group deciding to forego the benefits of federal tax exempt status 
(which is dependent upon a nonprofit form of organization) and organize a 
“church” as some form of business entity in which they would own shares, 
act as (or hire) ministers and open its doors to members.  The for-profit entity 
would pay taxes and be free to participate in politics unencumbered by the 
Internal Revenue Code’s restrictions.305  But would the autonomy precedents 
 
 304. Robinson, supra note 8, at 793. 
 305. See Matt Branaugh, Should Churches Reject Tax Exemption, As Huckabee 
Suggests?, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (June 12, 2013, 8:05 AM), http://www.churchlawa-
ndtax.com/blog/2013/june/should-churches-reject-tax-exemption-as-huckabee-
suggests.html.  A church might reject its tax-exempt status, as former presidential 
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protect it?  Could the owners hire and fire ministers with impunity?  Could it 
exclude anyone from membership?  Could it discriminate in hiring non-
ministers on the basis of their faith?  In short, could such an entity function 
primarily as a community of faith, analogous to a “church” as it is commonly 
understood?306 
Such an entity would likely be viewed as a business engaged in political 
speech.307  Perhaps if it made and distributed very little profit, for instance, 
and functioned in every way like a church organized as a nonprofit, it might 
be considered a “church.”  But if it was not intended to make a profit, why 
would it choose to organize as a for-profit in the first place?  It need not or-
ganize as a for-profit in order to reject tax exempt status; it can take on a non-
profit corporate form under state law, pay federal taxes and speak freely.  
Taking on a for-profit form suggests that profit-motive is involved.  If the 
entity functioned primarily as a profit-making entity whose owners were reli-
giously motivated, then it would likely be viewed more like the corporations 
in Hobby Lobby – and would enjoy religious freedom under a balancing ap-
proach, if available, but not autonomy.  If it were so committed to making 
money, in fact, the sincerity of the faith claim would be called into question, 
 
candidate Mike Huckabee suggested all should do, in order to have the right to speak 
freely on any topic without the restrictions of the Internal Revenue Code (or a church 
might lose its tax-exempt status because it has violated those restrictions).  See id. 
 306. The IRS’s website provides: 
Certain characteristics are generally attributed to churches.  These attributes of 
a church have been developed by the IRS and by court decisions.  They in-
clude: 
Distinct legal existence 
Recognized creed and form of worship 
Definite and distinct ecclesiastical government 
Formal code of doctrine and discipline 
Distinct religious history 
Membership not associated with any other church or denomination 
Organization of ordained ministers 
Ordained ministers selected after completing prescribed courses of study 
Literature of its own 
Established places of worship 
Regular congregations 
Regular religious services 
Sunday schools for the religious instruction of the young 
Schools for the preparation of its members 
The IRS generally uses a combination of these characteristics, together with 
other facts and circumstances, to determine whether an organization is consid-
ered a church for federal tax purposes. 
“Churches” Defined, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/
Charities-&-Non-Profits/Churches-&-Religious-Organizations/Churches--Defined. 
 307. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 
(2010). 
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and it would likely be viewed as a secular business with no religious claim at 
all.308 
In any event, organizing a church as a for-profit is not a realistic option 
for practical reasons.  First, the tax-exempt status of churches, itself justified 
on autonomy grounds,309 is deeply interconnected with many other federal 
and state religious exemptions.310  The whole web of protections, intended to 
further the independence of church and state, is built on the nonprofit nature 
of the religious community.311  This pervasive nonprofit identity and the ex-
pectations built upon that identity create substantial precedent.  Of course, 
one could challenge the government’s use of “nonprofit” as a traditional indi-
cator of religiosity in the new environment of blurred lines between nonprof-
its and for-profits and argue for unbundling the tax-exempt status, nonprofit 
form, and availability of other exemptions.  But prevailing on such a claim 
would be difficult, given the predilection of courts to resist any recognition of 
authentic faith community in the context of commercial enterprise.312 
Even beyond the practical legal obstacles a for-profit church may face, 
the for-profit nature of the entity creates insurmountable obstacles to any 
“church” trying to function as a worshipping community.  The notion that a 
church would be “owned” by someone, and that a product or service would 
be sold and the profits distributed to those owners is antithetical to our basic 
notions of a faith community.313  Professor Usha Rodrigues elaborates: 
 
 308. See Douglas Frantz, Scientology’s Puzzling Journey from Tax Rebel to Tax 
Exempt, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/09/us/sciento-
logy-s-puzzling-journey-from-tax-rebel-to-tax-exempt.html (discussing the criticisms 
of Scientology, which many have characterized as a business rather than a church).  
This has been the long-standing criticism of Scientology, despite the IRS’s decision in 
1993 (after a 25-year-long battle) to give it tax-exempt status.  See id. 
 309. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 675-78 (1970). 
 310. See infra note 311 and accompanying text.  The loss of tax status might lead 
to losses of autonomy-based exemptions under Title VII and the ADA, as well as a 
host of other exemptions currently available to churches.  See RICHARD HAMMER, 
2014 CHURCH & CLERGY TAX GUIDE 639 (2014). 
 311. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (granting nonprofit churches and religious 
nonprofits their tax-exempt status, by providing that “[c]orporations, and any com-
munity chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to 
foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its 
activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the preven-
tion of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to 
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activi-
ties of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legisla-
tion (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate 
in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any politi-
cal campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”). 
 312. See discussion supra Part III. 
 313. See, e.g., Thomas Reese, Pope Francis and the Three Temptations of the 
Church, NAT’L CATHOLIC REP. (Aug. 13, 2013), http://ncronline.org/news/spiritua-
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The benefits of religion include spiritual experience, social support, a 
sense of identity and belonging, and a framework for dealing with ex-
istential questions.  These attributes are simply inconsistent with a 
profit motive.  It is unlikely that a congregant would derive a satisfac-
tory spiritual experience or a sense of deep belonging from a church 
that sought primarily to make money or to advance the earthly inter-
ests of its owners.  And it is difficult to imagine that a congregant 
would feel socially supported by a church that charged market rates 
for spiritual counseling or participation in group activities.  The con-
cept of a for-profit church is incoherent because what churches pur-
port to offer is incompatible with maximizing profits.314 
In my view, while religion and profits may co-exist in some contexts, 
they do not when it comes to the core faith community. 
B.  For-Profit Entities That Provide Goods and Services Exclusively to 
Churches or Distinct Religious Populations 
While it may not be practical or even possible to operate a church for 
profit, there are many businesses that serve the particular religious needs of 
churches and other distinct religious communities or populations; some of 
these businesses might even be church-owned or sponsored.  Although they 
would not seek autonomy protections regarding members, they might seek 
categorical freedoms on questions regarding employment.  They might seek 
immunity under the ministerial exception or under Title VII’s exemption.315  
A federal district court recently held the ministerial exception inapplicable to 
a business; but the analysis from other courts faced with similar claims in the 
future is, of course, unknown.316  The Ninth Circuit has ruled out Title VII 
protection for any entity that charges beyond nominal fees, leaving both for-
profits and many religious nonprofits outside the exemption; but the Third 
 
lity/pope-francis-and-three-temptations-church.   Note that there is a major debate in 
religious circles on whether or not it is appropriate to run a church like a business, i.e., 
to use a business model when operating a church.  See id.  Indeed, Pope Francis notes 
that this is one of the three great temptations of the Church (to run the church like a 
business, in addition to clericalism and turning the Gospel into an ideology).  Id. 
 314. Rodrigues, supra note 301, at 1306 (internal citations omitted). 
 315. See generally Dyer, supra note 122; see also Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 
633 F.3d 723, 755-57 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish 
Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 316. Altman v. Sterling Caterers, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1384-86 (S.D. Fla. 
2012) (even if ministerial exception applied to FLSA, no applicability of ministerial 
exception to claims of mashgiach, who certifies food as kosher, because defendant 
kosher caterer is a for-profit commercial caterer, not a “religious institution”).  The 
court relied on Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Washington, Inc., 363 F.3d 
299, 307 (4th Cir. 2004); discussed supra note 114, in which the Fourth Circuit found 
the ministerial exception applicable only to noncommercial activities of religious 
institutions.  Altman, 879 F. Supp. 2d. at 1384-86. 
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Circuit simply considers the for-profit/nonprofit nature of the corporation one 
of many factors in deciding if an entity is an eligible religious corporation.317 
When a for-profit entity exists for a religious purpose, it differs from the 
typical for-profit that is created for any legal purpose with a goal of earning 
profits.  Consider a kosher or halal grocery.  This business has a religious 
identity and purpose (the provision of religious goods); it performs an im-
portant function in the life of a religious tradition by serving an identifiable 
religious community and enabling members of that community to exercise 
their religion.  It cannot abandon its commitment because of demographic or 
market changes, assuming its corporate documents ensure its continued reli-
gious commitments.  These “religious for-profit” businesses seem to be ju-
risgenerative insofar as they reinforce religious norms and facilitate individu-
al and collective religious belief. 
Several courts have already recognized the independent religious char-
acter of such entities, and have afforded autonomy protection under the Es-
tablishment Clause, by striking laws regulating fraud in the kosher food in-
dustry.318  Although almost half the states have regulations protecting con-
sumers from kosher fraud and mislabeling,319 the courts that have invalidated 
such regulations found them to excessively entangle the government with 
religion, inter alia.  The courts cited church autonomy cases as well as entan-
glement cases, which – like autonomy cases – are all about maintaining juris-
dictional lines: church and state must not intervene in each other’s affairs so 
that “each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.”320  Like 
autonomy cases, entanglement cases are categorical.  Because entanglement 
is an Establishment Clause doctrine, it does not take into account impacts on 
identifiable persons or groups.  So it is not surprising that in response to these 
decisions, many Orthodox Jews were concerned that they were deprived of 
basic consumer protection for the food they must purchase.321 
Consider another example of a provider of religious goods: a religious 
book publisher.  When Tyndale Publishers challenged the contraception 
mandate, it described a business that is quite restricted to religious identity 
 
 317. Spencer, 633 F.3d at 724; see Dyer, supra note 122, at 551. 
 318. Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 432 (2d 
Cir. 2002); Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat and Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337, 
1346 (4th Cir. 1995); Ran-Dav’s Cnty. Kosher v. State, 608 A.2d 1353, 1355 (N.J. 
1992).  In these cases, the courts are concerned with taking sides in religious disputes 
and taking positions on religious doctrine, since there are competing interpretations as 
to what is “kosher.”  See generally cases cited supra. 
 319. Elijah L. Milne, Protecting Islam’s Garden from the Wilderness: Halal 
Fraud Statutes and the First Amendment, 2 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 61, 66-67 (2006). 
 320. See, e.g., Commack, 249 F.3d at 425 (quoting Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. 
Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948)). 
 321. Cf. Milne, supra note 319, at 66-69.  The kosher food industry is a multi-
billion dollar business annually in the United States; there are many incentives to cut 
corners and perpetrate fraud on consumers.  See id. at 66. 
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and purpose: it publishes and distributes Christian literature.322  The publisher 
stood in sharp contrast to most all of the other businesses that challenged the 
mandate, which provided secular goods and services like arts and crafts sup-
plies or wood cabinets.323  As is clear from the amicus brief submitted by 
Christian, Mormon and Orthodox Jewish publishers in the Hobby Lobby liti-
gation, religious book publishers and book sellers perform a critical function 
in the life of a religious community.324 
Amici provide ready examples of for-profit corporations intended to 
serve religious communities: Deseret Book is both a for-profit corpo-
ration intended to generate a return for the LDS Church and an in-
strument of the Church itself.  Religious publishers and booksellers 
such as Feldheim, Tyndale House, and [Christian Booksellers Associ-
ation]’s members are for-profit businesses, but they also must select 
which books and other items are consistent with their religious persua-
sions, and a retailer typically needs to hire sales staff with compatible 
religious views.  Other for-profit corporations exist precisely to serve 
religious communities with specific religious needs – such as kosher 
butchering, Islamic finance, or pagan supply stores.  For these corpo-
rations, following religious practices dictated by religious law is es-
sential.325 
While the brief argued only for recognition of for-profit religious exer-
cise under RFRA’s balancing test, the quoted language suggests an expecta-
tion of autonomy protection for this industry, at least with respect to em-
ployment.326  Would these businesses defend an employment decision using 
the ministerial exception?  Would they invoke Title VII’s exemption to hire 
only co-religionists?  Indeed, Deseret Book might argue that Justice Brennan 
had precisely this type of church-affiliated publishing in mind when he noted 
in the Amos concurrence that it was “conceivable that some for-profit activi-
ties could have a religious character, so that religious discrimination [in em-
ployment] with respect to these activities would be justified in some cas-
es.”327 
 
 322. Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 116 
(D.D.C. 2012). 
 323. See supra note 51.  Mardel is the only other business that seems to be a reli-
gious for-profit.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2765 
(2014) (explaining that Mardel – unlike Hobby Lobby or Conestoga – is engaged in a 
religious endeavor: sales of Christian literature). 
 324. See Brief of Christian Booksellers Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Hobby Lobby and Conestoga, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-
354, 13-356), 2014 WL 343200, at *26-27. 
 325. Id. at *27. 
 326. Id. at *27-28. 
 327. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 345 n.6 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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Keep in mind, however, that not all church-owned or church-sponsored 
for-profits are necessarily “religious for-profits,” as the term is being used 
here, especially those that primarily earn money through secular, commercial 
pursuits.328  The LDS Church owns multiple businesses, all organized as for-
profits, with annual earnings in the billions.329  These include very lucrative 
real estate holdings and developments, agricultural enterprises like ranches 
and timber, media of all sorts – print, radio, television, digital – and an insur-
ance business.330  With the exception of Deseret Book (and other media busi-
nesses, assuming they are devoted to the Mormon faith), the “religious for-
profit” designation would not be appropriate. 
Businesses that are religious for-profits act as significant, and in some 
cases necessary, adjuncts to the life of a religious community.  Jews could not 
keep kosher without businesses that provided kosher food; likewise for Mus-
lims and their halal diet.  Numerous religious traditions rely on publishers 
that offer texts – both old and new – of a faith tradition.  The faithful rely on 
religious television and radio stations for edifying programming.  But do such 
businesses warrant autonomy in their employment decisions?  Let’s assume 
one of these businesses wanted to use the ministerial exception to defend a 
suit brought by a terminated employee whose duties involved core religious 
faith.  For example, consider a supervisor of a kosher kitchen in a for-profit 
facility who claims he was terminated solely on the basis of age discrimina-
tion.  Should the business be able to invoke the ministerial exception to de-
fend the suit?331  Should these types of businesses be able to invoke the au-
tonomy-based Title VII exemption to allow faith-based hiring when age dis-
crimination is at issue? 
Unless there are independent Establishment Clause or classic “church 
autonomy” reasons for providing such protection (as in striking kosher regu-
lations because they involve the state in religious decisions), autonomy prin-
ciples should not be available by constitutional mandate to these religious for-
profits, even with the important role the businesses play in the life of a reli-
gious community.  There are several reasons for this conclusion. 
 
 328. See id. at 349 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“It is not clear, however, that ac-
tivities conducted by religious organizations solely as profit-making enterprises will 
be as likely to be directly involved in the religious mission of the organization.  While 
I express no opinion on the issue, I emphasize that under the holding of the Court . . . 
the question of the constitutionality of the [Section] 702 exemption as applied to for-
profit activities of religious organizations remains open.”).  In her concurrence in 
Amos, Justice O’Connor suggested that inclusion of for-profit businesses within the 
scope of autonomy-based exemptions is more likely an establishment, giving “an 
unjustifiable award[] of assistance” rather than accommodating the free exercise of 
religion.  See id. at 348. 
 329. Caroline Winter, How the Mormons Make Money, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 
18, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-07-10/how-the-mormons-
make-money. 
 330. Id. 
 331. See supra note 316 and accompanying text. 
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First, the distribution of profit to owners compromises the jurisgenera-
tive nature of the entity.  To qualify for autonomy, the institution must be 
“organized around a religious mission with a guiding doctrine and goal to 
facilitate individual and collective religious belief.”332  The fact that the en-
terprise is owned means it cannot be completely directed towards those goals; 
profit is a substantial goal. 
Second, for-profits wield power in the economy, and impacts of categor-
ical protections can be harsh on people who need to participate in that econ-
omy.  There may be many commercial establishments with religious exercise 
claims, all the way from a small kosher butcher serving a local population to 
a national book publisher supplying numerous retail outlets.  (Indeed, the 
book publisher’s brief noted that even retail religious bookstores have to hire 
employees compatible with their message.)  All told, these businesses, as 
market actors, have power within the economy.  Excluding workers in entire 
sectors from certain types of legal protection (like some or all anti-
discrimination laws) will have negative impacts on specific persons and 
groups, perhaps in numerous markets. 
Denying autonomy protection to these businesses does not mean they 
enjoy no protection whatsoever.  They are still businesses involved in reli-
gious exercise.  Rather than the ministerial exception or the autonomy-based 
Title VII exemption, they might be able to rely on a balancing approach un-
der statutory or constitutional provisions, if available, to protect a given em-
ployment decision.  More specifically, these businesses might be able to rely 
on Title VII’s bona fide occupational qualification protection.  Under Section 
703(e)(1) of Title VII, employers have the right to discriminate on the basis 
of “religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, 
sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”333  
A kosher or halal business, or a Christian or Mormon book publisher or me-
dia company, may have compelling reasons for making a particular employ-
ment decision based upon religious qualifications – knowledge, experience, 
training, expertise.  Between general balancing approaches and more targeted 
protections (including legislative solutions), there may be sufficient accom-
modation in the law without placing businesses within the autonomy frame-
work.  Indeed, one of the three corporate entities in Hobby Lobby itself, Mar-
del, is a chain of Christian bookstores.  This is a religious for-profit, yet the 
Supreme Court treated it just like the other secular businesses in the litiga-
tion: within RFRA’s balancing framework. 
 
 332. Robinson, supra note 8, at 793. 
 333. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012).  For the religious exclusivity required, see, 
for example, EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 
1993). 
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C.  For-Profit Entities That Provide Educational, Health and Social 
Services to the Public 
Universities, hospitals, social services and other charitable institutions 
are typically organized as nonprofits; while the outer boundaries of autonomy 
coverage are contested, these entities do enjoy autonomy protection on spe-
cific matters.334  It seems inevitable that for-profit corporations will soon be 
undertaking these institutional roles alongside nonprofits: the for-profit edu-
cational institution has taken its place in society (even if viewed with skepti-
cism); for-profit hospitals are now common; and for-profit charities are burst-
ing on the scene – the result of growing hybrid, “quasi-profit” corporations 
like the public benefit corporation mentioned earlier and Dan Pallotta’s TED 
Talks.335  Given these larger trends, it should not be difficult to imagine a for-
profit with a religious identity and a religious mission traditionally associated 
with the nonprofit corporate form.  Indeed, we already have examples of 
churches or religious groups with for-profits in education, social services and 
health care.  The question is whether the types of autonomy protection avail-
able to religious nonprofits in these areas should extend to religious for-
profits. 
In the area of education, older precedent exists, albeit created inadvert-
ently.  Bob Jones University in Greenville, South Carolina, gained notoriety 
in the 1970s and 80s with its racially discriminatory admission policies and 
rules of conduct.  When it lost its tax-exempt status in 1983, this religiously-
affiliated university – which had been considered a religious nonprofit, exer-
cising a traditional nonprofit role as an educational institution – reorganized 
as a for-profit.  Unlike the newer educational for-profits that tend to be tech-
nical training schools, this was a university with all the characteristics of a 
religiously-affiliated university.336  This was unquestionably a religious for-
profit: it had a clear religious identity and purpose, it served the function of 
educating students within a religious tradition, and its corporate governance 
ensured continuity with its religious and educational mission.337  Assuming it 
 
 334. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 335. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, In a Child’s Lemonade Stand, the Transfor-
mation of a Corporation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2013, at B4, available at http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/12/in-a-lemonade-stand-a-transformation-of-the-
corporation/?_r=0. 
 336. See DANIEL L. TURNER, STANDING WITHOUT APOLOGY: THE HISTORY OF 
BOB JONES UNIVERSITY 236 (1st ed. 1997) (“As a result of the tax case, Bob Jones 
University is now unique among American educational institutions as the only educa-
tional institution that is operated ‘for-profit’ and is therefore taxed.  It is also the only 
‘pervasively religious’ organization in America that is taxed.”). 
 337. See id. (“Following the decision, the University’s organizational structure 
underwent significant changes.  The essential purpose of the organization was still 
education.”).  The University (which has repented of its racial policies) seems to con-
tinue to be organized as a for-profit entity (gifts to its general fund are not tax deduct-
ible), but gifts to particular programs, including scholarships, are tax deductible.  See 
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remains organized as a for-profit entity, should Bob Jones University get the 
benefit of the ministerial exception for certain positions?  The Title VII ex-
emption for religious educational institutions or the NLRB exemption for 
religious universities?338  Or does its for-profit corporate form fundamentally 
change the entity such that it should not be understood to be within the juris-
diction of “church”? 
Similar questions are raised in other contexts where intentional efforts to 
mix business and social responsibility are underway, thereby allowing the 
development of businesses with religious missions to serve social needs.339  
The “economy of communion” businesses, numbering about a thousand 
worldwide (with most outside the United States), are based on a model of 
business development that includes the sharing of resources and profits, im-
proving business to expand job opportunities, and spreading the values of 
common humanity and gratuity.340  Professors Luigino Bruni and Amelia J. 
 
BJU Scholarship Fund, BOB JONES UNIV., http://bjuscholarship.org (last visited Apr. 
6, 2015); Make a Gift, BOB JONES UNIV., http://www.bju.edu/giving/make-a-gift.php 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2015). 
 338. The Title VII exemption for universities is found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(e).  
§2000e-1(e) (2014) (exemption for educational institutions that are “owned, support-
ed, controlled or managed by a particular religion” or “the curriculum of such school . 
. . is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion”).  Note that, in the 
NLRB context, University of Great Falls v. NLRB requires a nonprofit corporate form 
for religiously affiliated universities in order to claim protection under the Catholic 
Bishop exemption from NLRB jurisdiction.  Univ. of Great Falls, 278 F.3d 1335, 
1344 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 339. See generally David Wallis, Gadfly Urges a Corporate Model for Charity, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2013, at F5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/08/
giving/gadfly-urges-a-corporate-model-for-charity.html?pagewanted=all (discussing 
the blurring of lines between for-profit and nonprofit); see also Timothy P. Glynn & 
Thomas Greaney, Nonprofit and For-Profit Enterprises: A Side-by-Side Comparison 
of the Law, IS A FOR-PROFIT STRUCTURE A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE FOR CATHOLIC 
HEALTH CARE MINISTRY? 55, 59 (2012), available at https://law.shu.edu/Health-
Law/upload/Catholic-Health-Care-Symposium-Proceedings.pdf (noting that for-profit 
corporations have “tremendous discretion to serve charitable and other purposes,” 
describing constituency statutes in states that allow non-shareholder constituencies to 
be taken into account, like employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, communities); 
Rodrigues, supra note 301, at 1259-60 (“The distinction between nonprofit organiza-
tions and for-profit firms is blurring before our eyes.  Corporate social responsibility, 
sustainability, and green movements have made doing good an important component 
of many products offered not only by nonprofits, but also by for-profit firms. . . .  
Corporate philanthropy has a long and distinguished lineage. . . .  But there is more: 
Nonprofits and for-profits now compete in areas formerly occupied almost exclusive-
ly by nonprofits [such as of microfinance, hospitals].”); Solomon, supra note 335. 
 340. See generally What Is the EoC?, ECON. OF COMMUNION, http://www.edc-
online.org/en/eoc/about-eoc.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2015).  This movement is con-
nected to the Catholic Focolare Movement, but is not limited to Catholic participants.  
See Economy of Communion, FOCOLARE MOVEMENT, http://www.focolare.org/usa/en/
professional-life/economy (last visited Apr. 6, 2015). 
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Uelman undertook a case study of over seven hundred of these businesses 
and concluded that “business endeavors may express religious commitments” 
through their service to the urban poor.341  Whether these would be called 
“religious for-profits” would depend, I think, upon the degree of connection 
between the business and religious mission.  For these groups, the profit mo-
tive is clearly tempered by communitarian and redistributive commitments; 
but while social norms are shared, a strong particularist religious identity may 
be lacking. 
For-profits with religious commitments could blossom under the new 
“benefit corporation” model.  Benefit corporations came on the corporate law 
scene in 2010, and almost forty states have either enacted or are considering 
enacting legislation that recognizes this corporate form.342  A “benefit corpo-
ration” is a for-profit corporation that is authorized to consider the general or 
a specified public benefit in addition to profit maximization; indeed, their 
directors and officers are expected to implement the public mission and to 
take into account other stakeholders’ interests.343  The benefit corporation is 
thus free to pursue a social goal without being concerned that a shareholder 
will sue for failure to maximize profits; instead, shareholder suits are availa-
ble to “compel the corporation to engage in the social benefit goals it was 
founded to achieve (even if such activities are at the expense of profits).”344 
Benefit corporations can be “formed in furtherance of religious purpos-
es, much like a religious non-profit.”345  The popularity of the public benefit 
corporation is increasing,346 so there is no telling what types of religious for-
profits the future may bring.  One can foresee any number of religious minis-
tries organized under this corporate form.  Marc Greendorfer argues that a 
 
 341. Luigino Bruni & Amelia J. Uelmen, Religious Values and Corporate Deci-
sion Making: The Economy of Communion Project, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
645, 651-57 (2006). 
 342. Marc A. Greendorfer, Blurring Lines Between Churches and Secular Corpo-
rations: The Compelling Case of the Benefit Corporation’s Right to the Free Exercise 
of Religion (with a Post-Hobby Lobby Epilogue), 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 
2014) (manuscript at 12), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2372464; see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 
(2014). 
 343. Greendorfer, supra note 342 (manuscript at 13-14). 
 344. Id. (manuscript at 12). 
 345. Id. (manuscript at 2); see also Steven J. Willis, Corporations, Taxes, and 
Religion: The Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Contraceptive Cases, 65 S.C. L. REV. 1, 
58-61 (2013) (proposing “faith based corporations” model statute for incorporating 
commercial enterprises with religious beliefs); Solomon, supra note 335 (discussing 
“socially motivated” for-profits, or for-profits with charitable purposes, noting that 
“[m]ore [than] a third of states have passed some type of legislation allowing for 
hybrid corporations, companies that do not have shareholder profits as their primary 
goal.  Instead, these companies can be run for social purposes with some of the mon-
ey going to social and charitable causes. . . .  Real companies have now become qua-
si-profit companies . . . .”). 
 346. See Solomon, supra note 335. 
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benefit corporation “with a religious purpose in its statement of purpose 
should be seen as identical to a non-profit under the [autonomy] doctrine.”347  
That obviously adds an entire class of corporations to the “church” jurisdic-
tion, which would be unprecedented.  Further, we have no way of knowing 
how they will operate in the market, what kind of power they will wield, and 
how extensive their autonomy impacts might be.  Moreover, at a time when 
the inclusion of some nonprofits within the autonomy circles is contested, the 
doctrinal instability does not argue in favor of expansion. 
Perhaps the most important question is whether public benefit corpora-
tions are capable of being jurisgenerative.  Professor Usha Rodrigues makes a 
compelling case in the larger sociological context that these entities, in con-
trast to nonprofits, will fail to create “social identity.”348  Like any for-profit 
corporation, they may involve tiered investment, so that some investors ex-
pect very little return because of the socially beneficial purposes of the corpo-
ration, whereas other investors expect a market rate of return.  Because an 
entity structured like this “could be different things to different investors,” it 
may be “too much of a hybrid to claim to provide any identity benefits.”349  
(And even without different classes of stock, investors still expect some re-
turn.)  This suggests that religious benefit corporations may not be able to 
generate and reinforce norms of shared identity and facilitate individual and 
collective beliefs with the focus and intensity of a church or religious non-
profit.350 
Religiously-affiliated health care ministry poses a unique set of circum-
stances for this Article’s inquiry.  This ministry is often carried out by multi-
ple entities – both nonprofit and for-profit – that are in various legal and fi-
nancial relationships to each other, all as part of a larger religious nonprofit 
health care system.  In Catholic health care, for instance, for-profit joint ven-
tures with physicians and for-profit subsidiaries (wholly owned by the non-
profit religious systems) are common.  Where they exist, such for-profit enti-
ties are part of a larger Catholic nonprofit hospital system and are under its 
control, share in its charitable mission and adhere to its ethical standards.351  
 
 347. Greendorfer, supra note 342 (manuscript at 17).  Mr. Greendorfer would 
consider closely held corporations like Hobby Lobby and Conestoga to be “de facto” 
benefit corporations with a religious purpose, with autonomy eligibility.  Id. (manu-
script at 20).  He does not distinguish between the RFRA’s balancing approach and 
the autonomy approach, something that I consider a critical distinction. 
 348. Rodrigues, supra note 301, at 1317. 
 349. Id. 
 350. See id. at 1317-18. 
 351. The religious nonprofit partner in a joint venture must have at least 51% 
control so that with a majority vote on the for-profit’s board, the sponsor can keep its 
tax exempt status.  See, e.g., St. David’s Health Care System v. United States, 349 
F.3d 232, 238 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[I]f the non-profit organization enters into a partner-
ship agreement with a for-profit entity, and retains control, we presume that the non-
profit’s activities via the partnership primarily further exempt purposes.”); see also 
Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718, 1998 WL 89783 (1998) (“[I]f a private party is 
64
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss2/6
2015] AFTER HOBBY LOBBY  445 
This use of for-profit entities may be wholly unrelated to profit motive; in-
deed, it may be driven by licensure requirements or the need for capital.  For 
example, a Catholic nonprofit hospital system might set up a for-profit joint 
venture with physicians or a for-profit subsidiary physician practice because 
the state’s law prohibits physicians from being employed or owned by non-
physicians.352  Or the choice to create a for-profit subsidiary for a managed 
care plan might result from the very practical difficulties of having one entity 
comply with both hospital and insurance licensing laws. 
Such for-profit entities already come within the protection of health care 
conscience laws at the federal level and in nearly all states, which apply to 
individuals and institutions regardless of their nonprofit/for-profit status.353  
The implementation of ethical standards for religiously-affiliated health care 
relies on the existence of conscience protection; and after four decades, for-
profit health care entities, and the nonprofit religious health care systems of 
which they are a part, have come to expect uniform conscience protection.  It 
is reasonable to assume that laws that protect corporate conscience on matters 
like abortion and physician-assisted suicide will continue to apply regardless 
of corporate form. 
The harder question of course is whether, in areas beyond conscience 
(like employment), autonomy should be limited to nonprofit corporate forms 
when profit motive is not the primary driver of for-profit form.  Indeed, a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of a religious nonprofit hospital – though for-profit 
in form – lacks profit motive.  Why not consider such a for-profit entity to 
have jurisgenerative potential?  Or take the following example, presented at a 
recent symposium on for-profit religious health care,354 of a for-profit struc-
tured in a way that attempts to neutralize the impacts of profit-motive.355  
Despite a rather complex corporate organization, its identity as a Catholic 
institution is clear and meant to endure.  First, the proponents of the model 
argued that “a for-profit organization can have a charitable mission.  The 
 
allowed to control or use the non-profit organization’s activities or assets for the ben-
efit of the private party, and the benefit is not incidental to the accomplishment of 
exempt purposes, the organization will fail to be organized and operated exclusively 
for exempt purposes.”). 
 352. This rule is known as the corporate practice of medicine doctrine.  See gen-
erally Nicole Huberfeld, Be Not Afraid of Change: Time to Eliminate the Corporate 
Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 243, 243-44 (2004). 
 353. See Carmella, supra note 159, at 79.  California is the only state with a con-
science law that makes corporate form relevant, protecting only nonprofits.  Id. 
 354. T. Dean Maines & Michael J. Naughton, Identifying Essential Principles for 
Catholic Health Care, in IS A FOR-PROFIT STRUCTURE A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE FOR 
CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE MINISTRY?, supra note 159, at 14 (“[C]an a for-profit 
Catholic health care organization participate in the deepest reality of its purpose, 
namely, ‘to continue the healing ministry of Jesus Christ’?”). 
 355. Leo P. Brideau, Examples of For-Profit Health Care Models, in IS A FOR-
PROFIT STRUCTURE A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE MINISTRY?, 
supra note 159, at 27. 
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point is, ‘for-profit’ describes our tax status; it doesn’t describe our purpose. 
Our purpose is continuing the healing ministry of Jesus – that is our pur-
pose.”356  In this joint venture, 80% is owned by a private equity firm whose 
investors expect a return and 20% is owned by a religious nonprofit.357 
[That nonprofit owner] has sole authority in perpetuity over compli-
ance with interpretation and application of the Ethical and Religious 
Directives (subject to the local Ordinary), as well as all other elements 
of Catholic identity – for example, charity care and community bene-
fit.  So if any private-equity partner were to put pressure on you to 
abandon the mission, to walk away from the poor, walk away from the 
vulnerable, the answer is [the nonprofit owner] has sole control within 
the partnership over every element of Catholic identity . . . in perpetui-
ty.  And so no ownership change in the company going forward can 
change that . . . .358 
An entity known in canon law as a public juridic person (approved by 
the Vatican) is the sponsor of the 20% nonprofit owner.359  The hospital is 
intended to function in the life of the church like any Catholic nonprofit be-
cause it will be operated in the same manner as the nonprofits in the same 
health care system.360  Thus, the corporate structure ensures that the Catholic 
mission is consistently maintained – a minority owner with full authority to 
preserve the religious identity and purpose. 
Should such religious for-profits enjoy autonomy protection in the em-
ployment context, under the ministerial exception and Title VII exemption?  
Several federal courts of appeals have applied the ministerial exception to 
religious nonprofits,361 outside the context of the church-minister relation-
ship, “whenever that entity’s mission is marked by clear or obvious religious 
characteristics.”362  Two of those cases involved hospital employees with 
specifically religious roles – a pastoral care associate and a chaplain.  A fed-
eral district court has applied the Title VII exemption to a nonprofit hospital 
to allow it to terminate an employee engaging in practices at odds with the 
entity’s religious identity.363  Should these nonprofit applications of the au-
 
 356. Id. at 38. 
 357. Id. at 29. 
 358. Id. at 31. 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. at 29. 
 361. Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2007) (reli-
giously-affiliated hospital); Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 
363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004) (nonprofit nursing home); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episco-
pal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991) (religiously-affiliated hospital). 
 362. Hollins, 474 F.3d at 226 (quoting Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 310). 
 363. Saeemodarae v. Mercy Health Servs., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1038 (N.D. 
Iowa 2006).  But see Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 746 (9th Cir. 2011) 
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tonomy doctrine be available to the religious health care for-profits described 
above? 
Even where profit motive may be lacking or restrained, this Article con-
tinues to resist the expansion of the autonomy doctrine.  Ensuring the integri-
ty of religious hospital systems that include for-profit entities is an on-going 
and vital task churches must perform; it is not simply something that is estab-
lished once and for all time in corporate documents.364  There is widespread 
agreement that the mission might be diluted rather than promoted by the in-
clusion of for-profit corporate forms, which makes it critically important that 
prudential judgments be made continually.365  Indeed, courts have voiced 
concern that partnerships or other ventures between financially weak reli-
gious nonprofits and strong for-profits might result in the loss of the charita-
ble mission.366  Given the relative recency of these nonprofit and for-profit 
collaborations, this Article continues to urge caution: to use a balancing ap-
proach on employment matters.  When an employer impacts someone’s live-
lihood, it should be required to articulate the religious issues at stake.  Indeed, 
a for-profit entity that is tied to a religious mission might still receive free 
exercise protection in court or through a legislative or regulatory exemption. 
But the categorical protections of the autonomy doctrine should be avoided in 
this context. 
 
(Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (specifically describing hospitals, whether nonprofit or for-
profit, as ineligible for the Title VII exemption). 
 364. Sr. Doris Gottemoeller, Ministry and Catholic Identity: Are They the Same?, 
in IS A FOR-PROFIT STRUCTURE A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE 
MINISTRY?, supra note 159, at 128 (“To return to the question with which we began, 
is for-profit health care compatible with our Catholic identity?  Can it be a ministry of 
the Catholic Church?  I would suggest that the jury is still out.  The judgments in-
volved with regard to ‘true good’ and ‘right means’ – the goal of prudence – will take 
time and experience to discern.  Simultaneous with the movement to for-profit models 
is the development of ‘hybridized models’ – Catholic systems with significant non-
Catholic divisions.  How much of this can we do without diluting Catholic identity 
beyond recognition?  Maintaining the integrity of Mission and preserving it through 
time will take dedicated leaders who see the vision and who have the requisite talent 
to enact it.  It will also take collaboration among Catholic lay leaders and the bishops, 
because the prudential judgments involved will not reside solely with the hierarchy.  
Venues for these trusting and mutually respectful conversations are not very common 
at the present time.”). 
 365. Id. at 125. (“In making that prudential judgment – which may vary from one 
example to another and which may require uncommon wisdom and courage – I would 
suggest two considerations that ought to guide the discernment: the integrity of the 
ministry itself and provisions for its continuity.  Both call for attention to the possible 
unintended consequences of any choice.”) 
 366. St. David’s Health Care Sys. v. United States, 349 F.3d 232, 239 (5th Cir. 
2003). 
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CONCLUSION 
We have moved quite a long distance from the closely-held, secular for-
profit corporation that is the paradigmatic business challenging the contracep-
tion mandate.  With the vast organizational and mission possibilities of reli-
gious for-profits, stretching Hobby Lobby beyond its balancing framework – 
and far beyond the type of for-profit entity at issue in the case – would put us 
dangerously outside the limited circumstances of the case. 
The religious for-profit, like the secular for-profit run in accordance 
with religious principles, receives sufficient protection under a balancing 
approach.  Just because an entity is not categorically exempt from a law, does 
not preclude a statutory or constitutional claim that the law substantially bur-
dens the religious exercise without advancing a compelling governmental 
interest.  Justice Sotomayor has made this point in a different context.  In a 
pre-Hosanna-Tabor decision of the Federal Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, the majority declined to apply the ministerial exception to the age 
discrimination claim of a pastor who had been fired from his church.367  In its 
place, the court applied RFRA.368  In a vigorous dissent by then-Judge So-
tomayor, who thought it was quite obvious that the ministerial exception 
should apply, she contended that: 
Catholic Bishop requires courts, where possible, to interpret statutes in 
ways that would avoid raising serious constitutional concerns [by us-
ing an autonomy approach].  In some cases, no such interpretation 
will be reasonably available.  In those cases, RFRA [i.e., a balancing 
approach] may provide an independent avenue both for protecting re-
ligious rights and for avoiding definitive resolution of constitutional 
questions.  Thus, RFRA should not be read to supplant the Catholic 
Bishop inquiry, but to supplement it.369 
An autonomy-based exemption may be necessary as part of the constitu-
tional design – in order to give wide berth to institutional free exercise and to 
foster free choice among individuals to enter and exit.  Such an exemption 
avoids excessively entangling the state into church affairs, prevents the state 
from making religious assessments that it is not competent to make, and facil-
itates the mediating role these institutions play in civil society.  But as then-
Judge Sotomayor noted, when such wide berth is not necessary – which I 
argue is the case with for-profits of any type – a balancing approach should 
be sufficient to protect the free exercise of religion.370  I am well aware that 
sometimes a balancing approach will not be available, depending upon appli-
cable state or federal law.  In those situations, legislative and regulatory solu-
 
 367. Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 107-09 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. at 118 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 370. See id. 
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tions might be possible.  This is preferable to the sweeping uncertainties the 
autonomy approach would bring. 
In sum, this Article has attempted to raise a new issue that is only a few 
steps beyond the threshold questions answered in Hobby Lobby: should 
courts read the decision to give autonomy protection to religious for-profits?  
The answer the Article has offered is a resounding no.  While these entities 
may appear to warrant autonomy protection, courts must understand that reli-
gious for-profits differ radically from those religious institutions that undeni-
ably warrant autonomy protection.  Further, they must understand that a 
whole new set of negative impacts on the lives and livelihoods of many 
would not be tolerable under our system of responsible religious freedom. 
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